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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

15  
BASIC  
OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR  
**"BLACKLIST"**  
OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 72


EDITION NO. 1

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FOR  
"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS  
TO OCCUPY  
JAPAN PROPER AND KOREA  
AFTER SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE

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Edition 3

8 August 1945



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
8 August 1945

1. The attached basic outline plan covers operations to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA after surrender or collapse of the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command.
2. Pending issue of over-all directives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this Plan is circulated to Senior Commanders and Staff Sections of the United States Army Forces, Pacific as a guide in their planning and preparation for prompt action upon termination of organized resistance in the areas to be occupied. Plans and preparations for this eventuality will be developed and maintained in an advanced state of readiness by higher echelons of this Command as a matter of urgent priority.
3. The Plan is being forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and the Commander, United States Army Strategic Air Force for their information.
4. Directives for the several operations to be conducted and indicated studies in support of the Plan will be issued by this Headquarters at appropriate times. The Plan itself will be amended in detail from time to time as conditions alter.
5. Every precaution will be observed to prevent such planning and preparation from becoming a basis for unfounded rumors of impending termination of the war. These activities represent preparation for an eventuality which might occur at any time, and while of highest priority, in no way reflect a belief in imminence of a cessation of hostilities.

For the Commander-in-Chief:

R. J. MARSHALL,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

  
S. J. CHAMBERLIN,  
Major General, G.S.C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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8 August 1945

1. DIRECTIVE.

a. This Plan is formulated pursuant to directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in radiograms WX-17064/14 June 1945, and to verbal directive of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, 22 June 1945. It covers operations of United States Army and attached forces under CINCAFPAC control, subsequent to sudden collapse or surrender of the Japanese Government and High Command, to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA, establish control of armed forces and civil population, and impose thereon those prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action.

The Plan provides for inclusion of the remaining RYUKYUS among CINCAFPAC's areas of responsibility, and regards them as minor off-shore islands of JAPAN Proper, to be occupied when means become available.

Provisions for extended occupation of the several areas and imposition of ultimate surrender terms therein will be covered in subsequent plans upon receipt of necessary directives.

CINCPAC's corresponding plan for conduct of the Naval and Amphibious operations involved in occupation of JAPAN Proper and KOREA is entitled "CAMPUS".

b. Assigned Responsibilities.

- (1) CINCAFPAC is charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the following basic responsibilities:

- [REDACTED]
- (a) Making plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN (WX-62774, 3 April 1945).
  - (b) Preparation of plans for occupation of JAPAN Proper (WX-17064/14 June 1945).
  - (c) Command of United States Army Occupation Forces in JAPAN (WX-62773/3 April 1945).
  - (d) Military Government in JAPAN to include the four main islands, adjacent off-shore islands, KARAFUTO and TSUSHIMA ISLAND (W-79828/9 May 1945).
  - (e) Control of U.S.-held positions in the RYUKYUS, including Military Government (V 73 BG 152/18 July and COMINCH/CNO 211820 July).
  - (f) Preparation of plans for occupation of KOREA in which Allied Forces will participate.
- (2) CINCPAC is charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with:
- (a) Making plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, on the plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN (WX-62774/3 April 1945).
  - (b) Responsibility for Military Government in the MARIANAS, BONINS, VOLCANOES, IZUS, KURILES and MARCUS ISLAND (JCS 1231).

[REDACTED]

c. Tentative terms of surrender for JAPAN require in substance (JCS 1275):

- (1) Cessation of hostilities and prompt disarmament of Japanese forces and people wherever located.
- (2) Relinquishment of all power by the Japanese Government to the designated military commander.
- (3) Continuation of maintenance of law and order by constituted Japanese officials and police.
- (4) Relinquishment of war-making materials and installations and evacuation of personnel from Japanese-occupied territories as directed by the designated Military Commander.

d. Although CINCPAC plans are drawn with the primary missions of occupying JAPAN Proper and KOREA and a collateral mission of completing occupation of RYUKYUS when means become available, preparation for execution of these missions recognizes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct CINCPAC to assume similar responsibilities with regard to additional areas in the Western Pacific.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

a. Hostile.

- (1) That the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command may surrender at any time.
- (2) That surrender of Japanese Commanders in occupied areas outside JAPAN Proper may have to be imposed by force.
- (3) That in event the Japanese Government and High Command in KOREA fail to conform to surrender in JAPAN Proper, appropriate offensive measures will be taken without diversion of means allocated to occupation of JAPAN Proper.

- [REDACTED]
- (4) That there is reasonable probability of active post-surrender resistance of considerable proportions within JAPAN Proper, particularly by suicidal elements of the armed forces who will take advantage of any weakness on the part of our forces.

- (5) That total Japanese forces to be disarmed will probably amount

to:	<u>JAPAN Proper</u>	<u>KOREA</u>
Army Ground Combat and Service	1,060,000	233,000
Air Combat and Service (Army & Navy)	425,000	27,000
Naval Crews and Personnel of Shore Establishments	<u>242,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>
	1,727,000	270,000
		<u>1,727,000</u>
Total		1,997,000

- (6) That Civilian Volunteer Defense Units requiring disarmament

may total:	<u>JAPAN Proper</u>	<u>KOREA</u>
TOKYO PLAIN	1,000,000	
KOBE-KYOTO-OSAKA	700,000	
NAGOYA	375,000	
North HONSHU	60,000	
SHIKOKU	150,000	
KYUSHU	675,000	
Other Areas	<u>250,000</u>	
	3,210,000	35,000
		<u>3,210,000</u>
Total		3,245,000

That armament of these units will be incomplete and confined to light weapons.

- (7) That, while at best the civil population of JAPAN Proper will observe an attitude of non-cooperation with our forces, some degree of cooperation may be expected from the civil population of KOREA.
- (8) That stocks and production of foodstuffs within JAPAN Proper and KOREA as a whole will, in general, remain adequate to maintain a minimum subsistence level for the population. That, initially, assistance in distribution of foodstuffs, and some reinforcement of supplies to major urban areas, will be required to prevent starvation and epidemic.

- [REDACTED]
- (9) That road and rail communications in JAPAN Proper will be sufficiently disrupted by air operations to require widespread rehabilitation of critical facilities prior to resumption of essential transportation of foodstuffs and to large-scale movement of our Occupation Forces into inland areas.
  - (10) That allocation of ship tonnage will be required during the early post-surrender period for transportation of materials for shelter for considerable elements of urban populations in JAPAN Proper to prevent epidemic and active unrest during the winter season. That such action will be required in KOREA to a lesser degree.

b. Own Forces.

- (1) (a) That participation by Allied Forces in the occupation of KOREA will be covered in subsequent directives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (b) That Allied Forces which may participate in occupation of JAPAN Proper will constitute a component of AFPAC Forces.
- (2) That the area of CINCAFPAC control in the RYUKYUS will be extended to include unoccupied portions of that Archipelago.
- (3) That the Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Air Force will support the operations to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA, subject to such other commitments as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.
- (4) That, subject to further instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prompt occupation of JAPAN Proper constitutes a first charge upon resources available to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and CG USASTAF. Concurrent occupation of KOREA constitutes a charge second only to JAPAN Proper in allocation of such resources.
- (5) That CINCAFPAC will be charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with imposition of surrender terms upon all Japanese located within his areas of assigned responsibility.

- [REDACTED]
- (6) That CINCAFPAC will be designated to coordinate and enforce upon the Central Japanese Government and Imperial High Command the demands upon those bodies of Commanders designated to occupy areas outside JAPAN Proper.
  - (7) That commitments necessary for prompt and effective occupation of JAPAN Proper and KOREA will take priority over any further commitments on the mainland of ASIA or FORMOSA.
  - (8) That military necessity will require prompt and widespread physical occupation of JAPAN Proper in order to effectively accomplish disarmament and bring home the fact of surrender to the Japanese people.
  - (9) That occupation in KOREA may be confined to major centers providing control of the Japanese Governmental and Military Organizations, and the communications of more populous areas.
  - (10) That uncertainties of the internal situation in JAPAN will necessitate mounting out of initial Occupation Forces prepared for landings against local opposition.
  - (11) That repatriation of personnel of the Japanese armed forces and their auxiliaries into JAPAN Proper from whatever source will be subject to prior approval by CINCAFPAC.
  - (12) That redeployment will continue until the full requirements of these operations and any further operation which may be directed into the mainland of ASIA and FORMOSA are satisfied.
  - (13) That one Marine Corps of three Divisions will be immediately available to CINCAFPAC for occupation purposes.

### 3. OPERATIONS.

#### a. Concept. (See Chart, Annex 3 a, General Concept of Operations).

This Plan covers the "Occupation Period" only. During this period, control of JAPAN Proper and of KOREA is established by progressive occupation, initially utilizing forces available to CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC at the time of

[REDACTED]

surrender or collapse. JAPAN is disarmed and provisions made for early turn-over to separate "Post-War" Governments and Armies of Occupation in JAPAN Proper and KOREA.

The preparation and conduct of the operations are decentralized to designated Army Commanders and their corresponding Naval Task Force Commanders to the greatest extent consistent with essential coordination by Superior Headquarters.

For planning purposes, it is visualized that dispatch of AFPAC Forces immediately available, to JAPAN and KOREA, is in strength to occupy selected major strategic centers against local opposition if offered. These forces are mounted with the maximum expedition permitted by availability of sea and air transport and are provided with appropriate naval support. Strong air and mobile ground forces, provided with immediately available naval support and amphibious transportation, are established at these points in order to isolate JAPAN from ASIA, seize control of higher echelons of government in both JAPAN Proper and KOREA, immobilize enemy armed forces, and initiate operations against any recalcitrant elements in the two countries. These strategic centers remain occupied in strength and serve as bases from which air and ground action can be brought to bear wherever required and from which subsequent occupations are conducted as rapidly as the availability of forces, transportation and the internal situation permits.

Follow-up forces are rapidly dispatched to initial objectives by all available transportation means as arranged by the respective Army Commanders.

Additional areas are occupied in two priorities as follows:

Selected strategic points to establish control of remaining major industrial and political centers and avenues of sea communications.

Selected minor areas to establish control of food supply and of principal overland and coastwise communications.

Objectives selected for occupation in the three priorities or phases outlined in preceding paragraphs are:



[REDACTED]

PHASE I - KANTO PLAIN, SASEBO-NAGASAKI, KOBE-OSAKA-KYOTO, KEIJO (KOREA),  
AOMORI-OMINATO.

PHASE II - JAPAN: SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO (HOKKAIDO).  
KOREA: FUSAN.

PHASE III - JAPAN: HIROSHIMA-KURE, KOCHI (SHIKOKU), OKAYAMA, TSURUGA,  
OTOMARI, SENDAI, NIIGATA.  
KOREA: GUNSAN-ZENSHU.

(Reference Map: Eastern Asia, 1/1,000,000, Army Map Service,  
Revised (AMS 3) 1944. Japanese place names used).

Additional points in PHASES II and III are occupied within means available as  
deemed necessary by Army Commanders in accomplishment of their missions.

The directed occupations permit control of the political, economic  
and military life of the two countries. The areas designated in JAPAN include 60  
percent of the population, 80 percent of industrial capacity and 48 percent of  
food production. Those in KOREA include 39 percent of the population, 18 percent  
of the industrial capacity and 44 percent of the food production.

Occupations in addition to those outlined above which may be required  
by national policy or Japanese attitude are directed by CINCAFPAC as dictated by  
the situation existent at the time.

Disarmament of Japanese Armed Forces and establishment of control of  
communications are primary initial missions of the Occupation Forces.

The United States Pacific Fleet conducts the naval and amphibious  
phases of the operations.

The Plan as drawn initially visualizes surrender prior to "OLYMPIC".  
In event surrender or collapse occurs after initiation of "OLYMPIC", occupation  
of unoccupied objectives listed above proceeds as outlined, leaving minimum garri-  
son in the "OLYMPIC" and any minor occupied areas.

Relative timing of the operations is dependent upon the shipping  
position at initiation date. Consequently, preliminary estimates of timing are

[REDACTED]

made as planning guides and indications of relative priority for shipping allocations only. Forces are dispatched in shipping and air lift allocated for movement of forces of the respective Armies as rapidly as they can be mounted. Occupation of selected objectives may be initiated by employment of airborne forces.

Occupations subsequent to PHASE I are conducted by Army Commanders as rapidly as the situation and availability of forces permit. Amphibious lift is made available in each Army area for this purpose.

The initiation date for the operation ("B"-Day) is designated by CINCPAC pursuant to instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will probably precede "VJ-Day".

Occupation of PHASE I objectives utilizes in general the forces earmarked for "OLYMPIC", plus some elements from "CORONET". Subsequent occupations utilize PHASE I forces, augmented by "CORONET" forces as the situation may demand. PHASE I forces are regarded as firm allocations for commitment as rapidly as practicable. PHASE II forces are allocated to Army Commanders for planning purposes and are subject to release by CINCPAC as required. An AFPAC Reserve is retained for disposition as necessary. Major units as received on redeployment are considered as AFPAC Reserve.

Allocations of forces are frequently amended to incorporate changes in availability incident to "OLYMPIC" and "CORONET".

In event further operations on the mainland of ASIA or FORMOSA are directed, they are initiated subsequent to occupation of PHASE I objectives and establishment therein of adequate protective air and naval elements.

b. Employment of Forces.

(1) Organization.

(a) United States Army Forces, Pacific.

For organization of United States Army Forces, Pacific, and allocation of areas of responsibility for "BLACKLIST" operations, see Annexes 3 a, General Concept, and 3 b

(2) (a), Organization of United States Army Forces.

(b) United States Pacific Fleet

Organization of the United States Pacific Fleet for these operations is as prescribed by CINCPAC.

(c) United States Army Strategic Air Force.

Organization of the United States Army Strategic Air Force for these operations is as prescribed by the Commanding General thereof.

(2) Forces.

- (a) UNITED STATES ARMY - Command of U.S. Army resources in  
FORCES, PACIFIC the Pacific. (Except Alaskan Department, USASTAF and Southeast Pacific).  
Operations of U.S. Army Forces,  
"BLACKLIST" operations.  
Command of AFPAC Occupation Forces  
and imposition of surrender terms in  
assigned areas of responsibility.  
Approval of repatriation of Japanese  
Forces and nationals to JAPAN Proper.  
Theater Command, SWPA.

1. Sixth Army - Landing forces, KYUSHU, SHIKOKU,  
and Western HONSHU area.  
Operations of Occupation Forces  
same area.  
Preparation of Sixth Army elements  
from Western Pacific.  
Mounting of elements transported  
under Sixth Army control.
2. Tenth Army - Landing forces, KOREA.  
Operations of Occupation Forces  
same area.  
Preparation of Tenth Army elements  
from Western Pacific.  
Mounting of elements transported  
under Tenth Army control.
3. Eighth Army - Landing forces, Northern HONSHU,  
HOKKAIDO, KARAFUTO.  
Operations of Occupation Forces,  
same area.  
Preparation of Eighth Army elements  
from Western Pacific.  
Mounting of elements transported  
under Eighth Army control.
4. First Army - Preparations for further operations  
(when available) as directed.
5. Far East Air - Land-based air support, "BLACKLIST"  
Force operations.  
Troop carrier operations.  
Preparation of FEAF elements for  
displacement to JAPAN and KOREA.  
Establishment of FEAF elements in  
designated locations.

- [REDACTED]
- 6. United States - Preparation and mounting of U.S. Army Forces from Middle Pacific for CINCAFPAC as directed.  
Army Forces, Middle Pacific  
Logistic support and administrative control of U.S. Army Forces in Middle Pacific.
  - 7. United States - Logistic support of U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific.  
Army Forces, Western Pacific  
Logistic support of "BLACKLIST" operations.  
U.S. Garrisons, Western Pacific, as directed.  
Preparation and mounting of Base Service elements transported under USAFWESPAC control.  
Disposition of captured Japanese war material as directed.
  - 8. Naval Forces, - Preparation and mounting of Naval and Marine elements, SWPA, for CINCPAC.  
SWPA
  - (b) UNITED STATES - Naval cover and support, "BLACKLIST" operations.  
PACIFIC FLEET  
(as arranged)  
Naval and amphibious phase, "BLACKLIST" operations, including Sixth, Tenth and Eighth Army operations.  
Preparation and mounting of U.S. Naval and Marine elements from POA.  
Theater Command, POA.
  - (c) UNITED STATES ARMY - Transport of troops by air as arranged.  
STRATEGIC AIR  
FORCE  
(as arranged)  
VHB operations.

(3) Coordination.

- (a) Command relationships between the United States Army Forces, Pacific, the United States Pacific Fleet and the United States Strategic Air Force, in the conduct of "BLACKLIST" operations, are as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (b) Commanders, Sixth, Tenth and Eighth Armies are charged with the coordination of planning of operations within their respective assigned areas of responsibility. Operations are conducted under the principle of maximum practicable decentralization of control in order to achieve objectives in minimum time. Commanders of Naval and Air Task Forces meet with Army Commanders concerned for coordination of planning of operations as directed by their respective Superior Commanders.

- [REDACTED]
- (c) Details of coordination of operations of United States Army Forces, Pacific and elements, United States Pacific Fleet, within JAPAN Proper and KOREA are arranged directly between Army and Naval Task Force Commanders concerned.
  - (d) The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, conducts troop-carrier operations to provide to Army Commanders the maximum practicable air lift of troops to JAPAN and KOREA. He coordinates with the USASTAF and ATC as hereafter directed by CINCAFPAC the details of employment of available combat and transport aircraft for troop movement purposes.
  - (e) CINCAFPAC arranges with CINCPAC for appropriate transfer to Naval control of naval vessels, equipment, supplies and Intelligence material.
  - (f) As arranged with CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC establishes and commands naval terminal and base facilities in JAPAN Proper and KOREA, which are required for support of forces under his command or control.

c. Operations Required.

(1) General.

(a) Designation.

These operations constitute the "B" or "BAKER" series of operations conducted by United States Army Forces, Pacific. Individual operations are designated by numbers within blocks of twenty assigned each of the Army Headquarters concerned. "B"-Day is the date designated by CINCAFPAC for initiation of the operations.

(b) Tasks.

1. General Tasks.

The following general tasks are assigned Army Commanders within their respective zones of responsibility:

- 
- a. Establish control of the armed forces and civil population in areas assigned and impose thereon prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action.
  - b. Prepare for establishment of separate post-war Governments and Armies of Occupation in JAPAN Proper and KOREA as subsequently directed.

2. Common Tasks.

The following tasks are common to the several operations projected in this Plan and apply within areas prescribed by the Army Commander concerned:

- a. Destroy hostile elements which oppose by military action the imposition of surrender terms upon the Japanese.
- b. Disarm and demobilize Japanese armed forces and their auxiliaries as rapidly as the situation permits.  
Establish control of military resources insofar as is practicable with means available.
- c. Control principal routes of overland communications.  
Control principal routes of coastwise communications, in coordination with Naval elements as arranged with the appropriate Naval Commander.
- d. Institute Military Government and insure that law and order are maintained among the civilian population.  
Facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly that which contributes to the subsistence, clothing and shelter of the population.
- e. Recover, relieve and repatriate Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees without delay.

- [REDACTED]
- f. Secure and safeguard intelligence information of value to the United States. Arrange with the U.S. Navy for mutual interchange and unrestricted access by each Service to matters of interest thereto.
  - g. Suppress activities of individuals and organizations which may be inimical to the operations of the Occupation Forces. Apprehend War Criminals as directed.
  - h. Assist with elements of the initial Occupation Forces the occupation of subsequent objectives as directed.
  - i. Prepare to impose terms of surrender beyond immediate military requirements as directed.
  - j. Prepare to extend controls over the Japanese as required to implement policies for post-war occupation and government when prescribed.
  - k. Prepare to transfer responsibilities to agencies of the post-war Governments and Armies of Occupation when established.
  - l. Assist the United States Pacific Fleet as necessary in establishment of naval facilities for naval search and control of coastwise communications as arranged.

(2) PHASE I. (See Chart, Annex 3 c (2), Concept of PHASE I Operations)

(a) Areas Occupied.

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Force</u>
"BAKER-TWENTY"	KANTO PLAIN	Eighth Army
"BAKER-TWO"	SASEBO-NAGASAKI	Sixth Army
"BAKER-TEN"	OSAKA-KYOTO-KOBE	Sixth Army
"BAKER-FORTY"	KEIJO	Tenth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-ONE"	AOMORI-OMINATO	Eighth Army

[REDACTED]

(b) Tasks.

1. Common Task.

The Army Commander arranges with the appropriate Naval Commander the details of employment of an amphibious lift of one-division capacity for post-PHASE I short-range amphibious operations as required in the Army area concerned.

2. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY"; KANTO PLAIN area; Eighth Army;  
Target Date for "Y" Day, B / 15.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations, occupy the KANTO PLAIN area; establish control for CINCPAC of the Central Japanese Government and Imperial High Command; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in the Eighth Army area as required.

3. Operation "BAKER-TWO"; SASEBO-NAGASAKI area; Sixth Army;  
Target Date for "A" Day, B / 20.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations occupy the area SASEBO-NAGASAKI; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in the Sixth Army area as required; assist the U.S. Pacific Fleet as necessary in establishment of naval base facilities in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI area.

4. Operation "BAKER-TEN"; OSAKA-KYOTO-KOBE area; Sixth Army;  
Target Date for "K" Day, B / 23.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations, occupy the area OSAKA-KYOTO-KOBE; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in the Sixth Army area as required; assist the U.S. Pacific Fleet as necessary in establishment of naval base facilities in the KOBE area.



- [REDACTED]
5. Operation "BAKER-FORTY"; KEIJO area (KOREA); Tenth Army;  
Target Date for "E" Day, B / 27.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations occupy the KEIJO area of KOREA; establish control of the Japanese Central Government and Army-Navy Command of KOREA; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in the Tenth Army area as required.

6. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-ONE"; AOMORI-OMINATO area; Eighth Army; Target Date for "O" Day, B / 30.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations, occupy the AOMORI-OMINATO area; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in Northern HONSHU, HOKKAIDO and KARAFUTO as required.

(3) PHASE II. (See Chart, Annex 3 c (3), Concept of PHASE II Operations)

(a) Areas Occupied.

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Force</u>
"BAKER-ONE"	SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA	Sixth Army
"BAKER-ELEVEN"	NAGOYA	Sixth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-THREE"	SAPPORO	Eighth Army
"BAKER-FORTY-ONE"	FUSAN (KOREA)	Tenth Army

(b) Tasks.

1. Operation "BAKER-ONE"; SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA area; Sixth Army;

Target Date for "C" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the area SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA of northern KYUSHU; establish ground and designated air forces for accomplishment of common tasks.

2. Operation "BAKER-ELEVEN"; NAGOYA area; Sixth Army;

Target Date for "M"-Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the NAGOYA area of Southeastern HONSHU;  
establish ground forces and air staging facilities  
for accomplishment of common tasks.

3. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-THREE"; SAPPORO area; Eighth  
Army; Target Date for "W" Day, as designated by CG,  
Eighth Army.

Occupy the SAPPORO area of HOKKAIDO; establish  
ground forces and air staging facilities for  
accomplishment of common tasks. Coordinate  
activities with CINCPAC forces occupying the KURILE  
ISLANDS.

4. Operation "BAKER-FORTY-ONE"; FUSAN area; Tenth Army;

Target Date for "R" Day, as designated by CG, Tenth Army.

Occupy the FUSAN area of Southern KOREA; establish  
ground forces and air landing facilities for  
accomplishment of common tasks.

(4) PHASE III. (See Chart, Annex 3 c (4), Concept of PHASE III  
Operations)

(a) Areas Occupied.

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Force</u>
"BAKER-THREE"	HIROSHIMA-KURE	Sixth Army
"BAKER-FOUR"	KOCHI (SHIKOKU)	Sixth Army
"BAKER-FIVE"	OKAYAMA	Sixth Army
"BAKER-TWELVE"	TSURUGA	Sixth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-TWO"	OTOMARI	Eighth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-FOUR"	SENDAI	Eighth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-FIVE"	NIIGATA	Eighth Army
"BAKER-FORTY-TWO"	GUNSAN-ZENSHU	Tenth Army

[REDACTED]

(b) Tasks.

1. Operation "BAKER-THREE"; HIROSHIMA-KURE area; Sixth Army;  
Target Date for "F" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the area HIROSHIMA-KURE of Western HONSHU;  
establish ground forces and air landing facilities  
for accomplishment of common tasks.

2. Operation "BAKER-FOUR"; KOCHI area; Sixth Army; Target  
Date for "G" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the KOCHI area of SHIKOKU; establish ground  
forces and air staging facilities for accomplishment  
of common tasks.

3. Operation "BAKER-FIVE"; OKAYAMA area; Sixth Army; Target  
Date for "I" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the OKAYAMA area, northern shore of the INLAND  
SEA; establish ground forces and air landing facili-  
ties for accomplishment of common tasks.

4. Operation "BAKER-TWELVE"; TSURUGA area; Sixth Army;  
Target Date for "N" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the TSURUGA area of FUKUI Prefecture and ad-  
jacent points as required; establish ground forces  
and air staging facilities for accomplishment of  
common tasks.

5. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-TWO"; OTOMARI area; Eighth Army;  
Target Date for "Q" Day, as designated by CG, Eighth  
Army.

- a. Occupy the OTOMARI area of KARAFUTO; establish  
ground forces and air staging facilities for accom-  
plishment of common tasks.

- b. Coordinate activities with CINCPAC forces occupying  
the KURILE ISLANDS.

- [REDACTED]
6. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-FOUR"; SENDAI area; Eighth Army; Target Date for "S" Day, as designated by CG, Eighth Army.

Occupy the SENDAI-MATSUSHIMA area of MIYAGI Prefecture; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.

7. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-FIVE"; NIIGATA area; Eighth Army; Target Date for "U" Day, as designated by CG, Eighth Army.

Occupy the NIIGATA area of Northwestern HONSHU; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.

8. Operation "BAKER-FORTY-TWO"; GUNSAN-ZENSHU area; Tenth Army; Target Date for "P" Day, as designated by CG, Tenth Army.

Occupy the GUNSAN-ZENSHU area of Southwest KOREA; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.

(5) Contingent Operations.

- (a) Headquarters, First Army, upon activation, is allocated tasks of planning for and conducting further AFPAC operations as directed.
- (b) Requirements for further AFPAC operations and consequent amendments in allocations for JAPAN and KOREA are formulated upon receipt of information concerning objectives and areas to be occupied.

d. Forces Required.

- (1) Estimates of the over-all ground and air requirements for Occupation Forces to accomplish PHASE I, II and III objectives, and Troop Lift Requirements for movement in naval assault shipping and by air are shown in Annex 3 d (1).

- [REDACTED]
- (2) "A solution" for employment of major units, ground forces, in "BLACKLIST" operations is shown in Annex 3 d (2).
  - (3) Deployment of land-based air forces in the Western Pacific for "BLACKLIST" operations is shown on Chart, Annex 3 d (3).
  - (4) Allocations of Naval assault shipping to meet Troop Lift Requirements for such types (Annex 3 d (1)) and of Naval Support, are made by CINCPAC. Allocations of aircraft for troop lift are made by CG, Far East Air Forces, who arranges for use of aircraft of the USASTAF and AUC as available.
  - (5) Estimates of Forces Required are amended to meet changes in the situation, by timely issue of amended Annexes 3 d (1), 3 d (2) and 3 d (3)

4. LOGISTICS. (See Annex 4, Logistics).

a. General.

- (1) Present logistic planning and instructions covering operation "OLYMPIC" are applied to the maximum extent possible in these operations, consistent with major changes in strategic and tactical concept.
- (2) United States Army and troops attached for the conduct of operations under the control of CINCAFPAC are staged, equipped and mounted out with prescribed equipment and supplies to the extent practicable and in the time allotted from the PHILIPPINES, RYUKYUS, MARIANAS, and/or HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
- (3) Naval forces employed in support of this operation under the control of CINCPAC are supported as directed by him.
- (4) United States Army Strategic Air Force is supported logistically in accordance with current arrangements and directives.

b. Responsibility for Logistic Support.

- (1) CINCAFPAC is responsible for the logistic support of United States Army Forces and attached troops under his operational control employed in these operations, except for Classes II, IV and V supplies for Marine and associated Naval forces.
- (2) CINCPAC is responsible for the logistic support of Naval services

[REDACTED]

under his control. In addition, he is responsible for equipping and providing mounting-out supplies for Marine and associated Naval forces which operate under the control of CINCAFPAC and resupply of Classes II, IV and V for those forces.

- (3) The Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, is responsible (except for the provision of Air Force technical and air ammunition supply) for provision of logistic support for all troops in occupational areas to the water line of the respective areas.
  - (4) The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, is responsible for the provision of Air Force technical and air ammunition supply for all United States Army Air Force troops (except the United States Army Strategic Air Force elements based in the RYUKYUS), employed in these operations, including Marine Air Forces under the operational control of CINCAFPAC.
  - (5) The Commanding Generals of Armies are charged with responsibility for logistic support of all troops in their respective occupational areas. Appropriate service troops are attached to Armies for the purpose of rendering direct logistic support in each Army area.
  - (6) The Commanding Generals, United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, Western Pacific and Tenth Army are responsible for re-equipping all units staging in and mounting from their respective areas (and the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces for technical equipment of Air Force units) to the limit of availability of equipment and supplies. They are further charged with supplying to all units mounted, to the extent available, accompanying equipment and supplies as prescribed by this headquarters.
- c (7) With respect to logistic arrangements for RYUKYUS, O.I. No 2, this headquarters, 30 July, governs for this operation.
- c. Resupply.
- Resupply is by "AUTOMATIC SUPPLY" to the extent practicable with

[REDACTED]

the then currently available resources, as follows:

- (1) In the event "B"-Day occurs considerably prior to "X"-Day for operation "OLYMPIC", resupply, and supply of the bulk of construction materials as may have to be imported, is by diversion of maintenance shipping from MIDDLE and WESTERN PACIFIC areas until "OLYMPIC" support shipping becomes available. Thereafter, shipping set up for the support of "OLYMPIC" is diverted in quantities necessary to meet "BLACKLIST" requirements.
- (2) In the event "B"-Day occurs at a time shortly approaching or immediately subsequent to "X"-Day, resupply, and supply of construction materials as indicated above, is by diversion of direct shipping set up for "OLYMPIC", augmented as may be required, within availability, from bases in the PACIFIC under the control of CINCPAC.

d. Evacuation and Hospitalization.

- (1) Evacuation of casualties by all services from the occupied areas initially is by naval assault shipping, followed at the earliest practicable date by the employment of aircraft and hospital ships.
- (2) Fixed-bed hospital units are established in occupied areas at the earliest practicable date, functioning initially in existing buildings or under canvas.
- (3) Evacuation of Prisoners of War and liberated nationals of United Nations is as prescribed in Annex 5 f, Basic Plan, Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.

e. Transportation.

- (1) CINCPAC provides Naval assault shipping for the transportation of initial, follow-up and succeeding Task Forces, with accompanying equipment and supplies from mounting areas to the objective.
- (2) Replenishment supplies, replacement equipment and construction materials are transported direct from the UNITED STATES or bases as indicated in paragraph 4 c above, in heavy shipping

[REDACTED]

as arranged for by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC.

- (3) The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, plans for and executes air dropping of emergency supplies to Prisoners of War and civilian internees of United Nations held in known Japanese Camps, exclusive of those in areas under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, as indicated in Appendix A, to Annex 4, Logistics.

f. Construction.

- (1) Construction in the occupied areas is limited to provision of minimum essential operative facilities. Use of imported materials is kept to an absolute minimum, Japanese materials being utilized to the extent of availability.
- (2) CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC are each responsible for the construction of Army and Naval facilities and installations required for the support of the forces under their respective controls.
- (3) Construction materials and Engineer construction effort required to construct facilities and installations necessary for the support of the forces operating under their control are provided by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, respectively.
- (4) The Commanding Generals of Armies are responsible for the construction and development of approved Army construction projects in their respective areas immediately following initiation of operations.

g. Local Resources.

Maximum use will be made of available local resources, including existing installations and labor. Disarmed Japanese Military Forces are utilized for labor to the extent practicable.

5. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. For Communications Plan, see Annex 5 a.
- b. For Assumed Terms of Surrender, see Annex 5 b.
- c. For Basic Plan for Establishment of Control of the Armed Forces and Military Resources of the Enemy, see Annex 5 c.
- d. For Basic Intelligence Plan, including Initial Handling of War



[REDACTED]

Criminals and Security Suspects, see Annex 5 d.

e. For G-2 Estimate of the Hostile Situation, "BLACKLIST" Operations, see Annex 5 e.

f. For Basic Plan for Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees, see Annex 5 f.

g. For Summary of CINCPAC Plan "CAMPUS" for Naval and Amphibious Operations, see Annex 5 g.

h. This Plan will be supported by the following:

- (1) "Basic Plan for Institution of Military Government". This Plan covers Military Governments and Relations of Occupation Forces with the Civil Population in JAPAN Proper and KOREA during the "Occupation Period", i.e., up to the transfer of responsibility to the post-hostilities Governments and Armies of Occupation.
- (2) Troop Lists, "BLACKLIST" Operations.



DISTRIBUTION LIST

"BLACKLIST"

Edition 3

8 August 1945

CG, First Army.....	1
CG, Sixth Army.....	3
CG, Eighth Army.....	3
CG, Tenth Army.....	3
CG, FEAF.....	3
CG, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific.....	3
CG, ASCOM "C".....	1
Staff, GHQ.....	15



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[REDACTED]

BASIC OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR  
"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS  
TO OCCUPY  
JAPAN PROPER AND KOREA  
AFTER SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE

ANNEXES

- 3 a GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
- 3 b (2) (a) ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES.
- 3 c (2) CONCEPT OF PHASE I OPERATIONS.
- 3 c (3) CONCEPT OF PHASE II OPERATIONS.
- 3 c (4) CONCEPT OF PHASE III OPERATIONS.
- 3 d (1) ESTIMATE OF FORCES AND TROOP LIFT REQUIREMENTS.
- 3 d (2) EMPLOYMENT OF MAJOR UNITS, GROUND FORCES.
- 3 d (3) DEPLOYMENT OF LAND-BASED AIR FORCES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC.
- 4 LOGISTICS.
- 5 a COMMUNICATIONS PLAN, "BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS.
- 5 b ASSUMED TERMS OF SURRENDER.
- APPENDIX 4-----ENFORCEMENT OF SURRENDER TERMS.
- 5 c BASIC PLAN FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE ENEMY.
- APPENDIX 6 a----STANDARDS FOR DISARMAMENT OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES.
- APPENDIX 6 b----PROCEDURES FOR DEMOBILIZATION OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL.
- 5 d BASIC INTELLIGENCE PLAN "BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS.
- 5 e G-2 ESTIMATE OF HOSTILE SITUATION.
- 5 f BASIC PLAN, CARE AND EVACUATION OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES.
- 5 g SUMMARY OF CINPAC PLAN "CAIPUS" FOR NAVAL AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.


SUPPORTING PLANS TO FOLLOW:

"Basic Plan for Institution of Military Government, "BLACKLIST" Operations."

"Troop Lists, 'BLACKLIST' Operations."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



ANNEX 'A

"BLACKLIST"

GENERAL CONCEPT  
OF  
OPERATIONS

LEGEND

- A. ARMY ZONES OF RESPONSIBILITY 10TH 6TH
- B. CENTERS OF OCCUPATION:
  - PHASE I
  - PHASE II
  - PHASE III

CONTROLS EXERCISED FROM INDICATED CENTER OF OCCUPATION, AUGMENTED BY ADDITIONAL OCCUPATIONS AS NECESSARY.

C. AREAS ASSIGNED CINCPAC-CINCPAC BY JCS.

NOTES:


1. PHASE I COMMITMENT:
  - PHILIPPINES - 10 2/3 DIVS
  - RYUKYUS - 2 DIVS
  - MARIANAS - 2 DIVS
  - HAWAII - 2 DIVS
  - TOTAL 16 2/3 DIVS
2. PHASE II FOLLOW-UP:
  - (AS RELEASED BY CINCPAC)
  - 3 DIVS - (P.I.)
3. AFPAC RESERVE:
  - 3 DIVS AND 1 AIRBORNE RCT (P.I.), PLUS DIVISIONS AS REDEPLOYED.
4. BOUNDARIES:
  - A. TENTH ARMY - SIXTH ARMY: - A LINE UTSURYO-TO (TO 10TH ARMY) - TSUSHIMA - FUKUE SHIMA (BOTH TO 6TH ARMY).
  - RYUKYUS PASS TO COMMANDER SERVICE COMMAND "I", UPON DEPARTURE OF 10TH ARMY TO KOREA.
  - B. SIXTH ARMY - EIGHTH ARMY: - A LINE FOLLOWING THE EASTERN BOUNDARY OF PREFECTURES (ALL TO SIXTH ARMY) AS FOLLOWS: - SHIZUOKA-NAGANO-TOYAMA

FORMOSA - KARAFUTO

SCALE BAR: 0 25 50 75 100 200 300 400 500 MILES  
AZIMUTHAL EQUIDISTANT PROJECTION CENTERED ON TOKYO  
DUMERIS COME TO TOKYO FROM ANY POINT ON THE MAP FOLLOWING A STRAIGHT LINE.  
TRUE IN DISTANCE AND DIRECTION.

\_\_\_\_\_

"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS




ANNEX 3 C (2)  
"BLACKLIST"

CONCEPT  
OF  
PHASE I  
OPERATIONS


PART I  
FOR  
VJ - DAY  
BETWEEN

1 AUG AND 15 OCT  
1945

LEGEND



- NOTES:
1. ALLOCATIONS AS OF 15 AUG 1945.
  2. DIVISIONS DESIGNATED WHEN "B-DAY" DETERMINED. SEE ANNEX 3 D (2) FOR "A SOLUTION."
  3. SHIPPING AND NAVAL SUPPORT ARE ALLOCATED TO OPERATIONS IN PRIORITY INDICATED BY RELATIVE TIMING SHOWN. TOKYO IS OCCUPIED FIRST, OTHERS AS RAPIDLY AS ARMY COMMANDERS ARE ABLE WITH SHIPPING ALLOCATED.
  4. MINIMUM FORCES FOR ENTRY MAY, IF SITUATION REQUIRES, BE INCREASED TO FULL COMMITMENT PRIOR TO ENTRY AT DISCRETION OF CINCPAC IF SITUATION AT THE OBJECTIVE JUSTIFIES DELAY. OTHERWISE LIFT IS ALLOCATED FOR MINIMUM COMMITMENTS IN PRIORITY SHOWN, FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL INCREMENT IN SAME PRIORITY.
  5. AIR LIFT ALLOCATED FOR MOVEMENT OF TROOPS SUBSEQUENT TO INITIAL SEABORNE EXPEDITIONS IS ARRANGED BY FEAF.



ANNEX 3 c (3)  
"BLACKLIST"

CONCEPT  
OF  
PHASE II  
OPERATIONS

PART I

FOR  
VJ - DAY  
BETWEEN

1 AUG AND 15 OCT 1945


LEGEND

PHASE II OCCUPATIONS  
AND ALLOCATIONS

PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS  
AND AVAILABLE FORCES

NOTES:

1. ALLOCATIONS AS OF 15 AUG 1945
2. PHASE II ALLOCATIONS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, RELEASED BY CINCPAC AS SITUATION DEMANDS.
3. PHASE II ALLOCATIONS FORWARDED FROM MOUNTING ARE AS ADMINISTRATIVE TROOP MOVEMENTS AS RAPIDLY AS SHIPPING ALLOCATED TO ARMY COMMANDERS PERMITS. PROCEED TO PHASE I BASES OR PHASE II OBJECTIVES AS APPROPRIATE.



ANNEX 3 C (4)

"BLACKLIST"

CONCEPT

OF

PHASE III

OPERATIONS

PART I

FOR

VJ - DAY

BETWEEN

1 AUG AND 15 OCT 1945

LEGEND

PHASE III OCCUPATION :-

DESIGNATION

B/25

OBJECTIVE

PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS


AVAILABLE FORCES

IN JAPAN & KOREA

AFPAC RESERVE

NOTES:

OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY  
ARMY COMMANDERS AS RAPIDLY  
AS SITUATION PERMITS, EMPLOY-  
ING REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF  
FORCES AVAILABLE, AUGMENTED  
FROM AFPAC RESERVE AS  
NECESSARY.







INITIAL WESTERN PACIFIC/INDO PACIFIC  
COMMITMENT CONTROL

1 GP F  
1 GP MB  
2 SQ TC  
1 SQ PHOTO RCN  
1 FLT ASR

INITIAL  
COMMITMENT

CONTINGENT  
COMMITMENT

NAVAL  
CONTROL

1 GP COMMANDO  
1 SQ PHOTO RCN  
2 GPS HB  
1 GP LB  
2 GPS F  
1 GP VMF  
2 GPS TC  
2 SQ F(N)  
1 SQ ASR  
1 SQ TACR  
2 SQ PHOTO RCN  
1 GP F  
1 SQ TACR  
1 GP HB

1 SQ SEARCH (I)

2 GPS VHB A  
2 GPS HB  
2 GPS MB/LB  
3 GPS F  
1 SQ F(N)  
1 SQ PHOTO RCN  
1 SQ COMBAT MAPPING  
1 SQ PHOTO CHARTING  
3 GPS USMC  
5 SQ SEARCH

4 GPS F  
1 SQ F(N)

2 SQ SEARCH (I)  
2 SQ TC  
1 SQ SEARCH (I)

1 GP MB  
1 GP TC  
1 SQ LAB(HB)  
1 SQ ASR(-IFT)  
1 GP F  
1 GP VMF  
2 GPS HB  
1 GP LB  
1 GP F  
1 SQ F(N)

20 GPS VHB  
1 SQ PHOTO RCN  
1 SQ ASR  
1 GP USMC  
5 SQ SEARCH

1 GP F  
2 GPS HB  
1 GP MB  
2 SQ F(N)  
2 SQ PHOTO RCN  
2 1/2 GPS TC  
1 SQ ASR  
2 GPS TRAINING  
1 SQ SEARCH

2 SQ SEARCH (I)

LEGEND

ARMY AIR FORCES:

INITIAL COMMITMENT

FOLLOW-UP, SUBJECT  
TO AFPAC RELEASE

NAVAL AND MARINE  
AIR FORCES:

(ALLOCATED BY CINCPAC,  
ESTIMATED DEPLOYMENT  
SHOWN AS A GUIDE ONLY)

NOTES:

(1) THESE SEARCH SQUADRONS  
(I) MAY BE SEA OR LAND BASED

(2) CONTINGENT ALLOCATION FOR  
PLANNING PURPOSES RELEASED  
BY CINCPAC AS SITUATION  
DEMANDS.

(3) GARRISONS (OTHER THAN  
JAPAN AND KOREA) SHOWN  
ARE RESIDUE SHOULD  
CONTINGENT COMMITMENT  
BE MADE.

ANNEX 3D (3)

"BLACKLIST"

DEPLOYMENT

OF

LAND-BASED AIR FORCES

IN THE

WESTERN PACIFIC

PART I

DEPLOYMENT

AS OF (B-DAY + 50)

FOR VJ-DAY BETWEEN

1 AUG AND 15 OCT 1945

BLACKLIST  
BASIC LOGISTIC PLAN

I. GENERAL:

1. This operation consists of a series of landings by United States Army and attached forces under control of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC, subsequent to sudden collapse or unconditional surrender of the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command. The objective is the occupation of critical areas in JAPANESE Home Islands and KOREA, establishment of control over the armed forces of the enemy, the civilian population of occupied areas, and the imposition thereon of those prescribed terms of unconditional surrender requiring immediate military action.

2. Ground, air, and follow-up elements are mounted from bases under the control of the Commanding Generals, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN and MIDDLE PACIFIC, and TENTH U. S. Army, and moved to the objective areas in Naval assault shipping.

3. After occupation of the areas KANTO PLAIN, SHIMONOSEKI-YAWATA, KOBE-OSAKA-KYOTO, AOMORI-OMINATO and JINSEN-KEIJO areas, bases are established with minimum construction at YOKOHAMA, YAWATA, OSAKA, OMINATO and JINSEN. Naval and air facilities are developed as required. The railroads and highway net are rehabilitated to the extent necessary for logistic support of the forces and control of civilian population.

4. Because of uncertainty as to date of initiation of operations, troops will be mounted with equipment and accompanying supplies which can be made immediately available to them upon determination and announcement of B-Day. The commanders respon-

[REDACTED]

sible for provision of equipment and accompanying supplies will take all possible measures to completely equip all units designated for these operations and have available in the vicinity of staging areas accompanying supplies in the quantities as indicated hereinafter.

II. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT:

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, is to provide equipment and accompanying supplies and replenishment of Class II, IV and V supplies for U. S. Marine and associated Naval forces employed in these operations under the control of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC.

2. The Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, provides accompanying air force technical supplies and air ammunition and replenishment thereof for all U. S. Army Air Forces employed in these operations except the U. S. ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE.

3. a. Commanding Generals of Armies are responsible for logistic support of all U. S. Army and attached troops in their respective areas of occupation.

b. Army commanders organize from service forces made available to them, Army Service Commands "Six", "Eight" and "Ten", as may be appropriate, for the purpose of rendering logistic support to their commands in areas of occupation.

c. Army commanders receive supplies and materials made available to them, aboard ships, at ports in their respective areas of occupation.

4. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC is responsible for:

a. The provision of supplies and materials required by Army commanders for the support of forces in their respective areas of occupation. He delivers to Army commanders required supplies and materials, aboard ships, in ports of areas of occupation at which point his responsibility terminates.

b. Providing to Army commanders suitable headquarters for Service Commands "Six" and "Eight", utilizing personnel and the service forces available to him, including personnel and organizations of USASCOM "C" tasks released by this headquarters.

### III. SUPPLY:

1. The Commanding Generals of the U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, MIDDLE PACIFIC, AND TENTH ARMY, to the extent of availability, provide supplies to accompany all Army forces employed in these operations, and mounted from their respective areas, as follows:

Classes I, II, IV (less construction materials)	30 D/S
Class III - For units arriving in objective area prior to B / 30	15 D/S
After B / 30 - Class III less MT and ADF	15 D/S
MT and ADF	5 D/S
Class IIIA - For air combat units arriving in objective areas prior to B / 30	15 D/S
For units arriving after B / 30 (Lubricants only)	15 D/S
Class V (combat troops)	3 U/F
Class V (service troops)	1 U/F
Class VA	15 D/S

Class IV construction materials: Sufficient materials, including necessary equipment to initiate required minimum construction or rehabilitation of airdromes, signal communication and

[REDACTED]

port facilities, accompanies combat echelons in Naval assault shipping. Thereafter, construction materials will be supplied in heavy shipping from Pacific bases or, if required, from the UNITED STATES.

2. Mounting-out supplies as indicated above for Marine and associated Naval forces operating under Army control are made available as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

3. Resupply is by "AUTOMATIC SUPPLY" utilizing available resources and by the diversion of maintenance ships, as required, and continues until local stockages and requisitioning procedures can be established.

4. a. In the event B-Day occurs considerably prior to X-Day for operation OLYMPIC, resupply and the supply of the bulk of construction materials are by diversion of maintenance shipping from MIDDLE PACIFIC and WESTERN PACIFIC areas and special loadings therefrom until OLYMPIC shipping becomes available. Thereafter shipping set up for support of OLYMPIC is diverted in quantities necessary to meet BLACKLIST requirements.

b. In the event B-Day occurs at a time shortly preceding or immediately subsequent to X-Day, resupply and supply as indicated above are by diversion of direct shipments set up for OLYMPIC, augmented as may be required within availability, from bases in the Pacific under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC.

5. a. Until 1 November 1945, at which time OLYMPIC shipping becomes available, diversion of maintenance shipping for supply of forces is accomplished as follows:

[REDACTED]

(1) The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, determines and diverts from shipping consigned to Western Pacific bases, ships required for the support of the SIXTH and EIGHTH U. S. ARMIES and attached troops.

(2) The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES MIDDLE PACIFIC, determines and diverts from shipping consigned to Middle Pacific bases, ships required for the support of the TENTH U. S. ARMY and attached troops. These diverted ships are made available to the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC at OKINAWA or other designated points from where they are moved forward by the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, as required.

b. Subsequent to 1 November, 1945, when OLYMPIC shipping becomes available, the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, assumes responsibility for diversion of all resupply shipping required for support of all U. S. Army Forces in areas of occupation.

c. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, makes available to the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC at OKINAWA or other designated point(s) supplies of Class II, IV and V, in ships as required, for the support of Marine and associated Naval forces under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC.

[REDACTED]

6. a. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC is responsible for the procurement of all replenishment supplies (except air force technical supplies and Class II, IV and V supplies for Marine and associated Naval forces) for forces employed in the occupied areas under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC. He is responsible for the movement of all supplies except for Marine and associated Naval forces in ships to designated Naval convoy rendezvous points or appropriate ports.

b. The Commanding General, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, provides replenishment supplies of Class II, IV and V for Marine and associated Naval forces under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC to rendezvous points or appropriate ports in heavy shipping provided by him, where his responsibility terminates.

c. The Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES is responsible for the procurement of replenishment supplies of all U. S. Army air force technical supplies, including air ammunition but excluding Avgas, which are moved to the occupational areas in shipping provided by the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC.

7. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC coordinates the loading of cargo ships with appropriate commanders of all agencies responsible for loading support shipping.

8. In the occupied areas Army commanders establish, as early as practicable, the following stockages:



[REDACTED]

a. Classes I, II, III (lubricants and greases only) and IV: 15 days' reserve and 15 days' operating level.

b. Class III (except lubricants and greases): 10 days (packaged), 15 days (bulk).

c. Class IIIA: 15 days' operating level.

d. Class V: 5 U/F for combat forces and 1 U/F for service troops, including ammunition in hands of troops.

e. Class VA: 15 days' operating level.

9. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, is responsible for the procurement and movement to ports of occupied areas, food, medical supplies, and other items for the relief of Allied Prisoners of War, liberated nationals of United Nations, and the civilian population, phasing deliveries as indicated in "Basic Plan for Institution of Military Government, BLACKLIST Operations" (to follow).

#### IV. EVACUATION:

1. Evacuation from occupied areas is by hospital ships and aircraft. Evacuation from the occupied areas direct to the UNITED STATES is initiated at the earliest practicable date.

2. Responsibility for evacuation is as follows:

By water: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

By air : The Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES.

To ports, air strips, and hospitals in the occupied areas: Army commanders.

3. Geneva-protected hospital ships, operating under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, are available for evacuation from the occupied areas.

[REDACTED]

4. This headquarters arranges for evacuation of patients to the UNITED STATES by U. S. Army Air Transport Command.

5. Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and liberated nationals of United Nations is to destinations as later determined. Transportation for this personnel will be by commercial shipping or appropriate transports following release from amphibious operations, and by hospital ships where necessary. (See Annex 5 f, Basic Plan, Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees)

6. Evacuation of enemy prisoners of war from occupied areas is by direction of this headquarters only.

7. Japanese civilian casualties are not evacuated from the occupied areas.

8. Salvageable material is not evacuated from the occupied areas. Repairable material is reconditioned in the areas and returned to stocks or combat organizations. Captured material, surplus to the needs of combat forces and military government agencies, is assembled and held for later disposition as directed by this headquarters.

V. HOSPITALIZATION:

1. During the early phases of operations and prior to the establishment of fixed hospitals in the occupied areas, minor casualties are hospitalized in mobile-type hospitals assigned to the combat forces. Casualties not returnable to duty within 30 days during the period from landing date to plus 30 are evacuated to hospitals at rear bases where bed credits are established. Thereafter, hospitalization is in hospitals as they become estab-

[REDACTED]

lished in the occupied areas.

2. In order to reduce evacuation from occupied areas, fixed-type hospital units, station and general hospitals, designated for this operation are established in areas in accordance with prescribed phasing. Fixed-bed type hospital units will be established in occupied areas, based on four per cent of forces employed in each area. Initially these units function in existing buildings or under canvas, with essential prefabricated buildings. Construction of prefabricated buildings (temperate-climate type) for 100 per cent of total hospital beds not operating in existing buildings is completed at the earliest possible date.

3. The maximum use, consistent with the minimum needs of the civilian population, is made of existing civilian hospitals and other suitable buildings for hospitalization of patients.

#### VI. TRANSPORTATION:

1. Naval assault craft is used for transportation of combat and supporting service elements forward from mounting areas and for the movement of follow-up forces, succeeding task forces, and base and garrison units, including organizational equipment and accompanying supplies. Maintenance supplies are transported forward in heavy shipping.

2. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC moves shipping forward to ports in occupied areas as requested by Army commanders.

3. Estimates of troops, equipment, and cargo, including maintenance and construction materials, and supplies for Military

[REDACTED]

Government agencies to be moved to occupied areas are shown in appendices to follow.

4. Railways and rolling stock required for military use and control of civilian population in occupied areas, that can be rapidly rehabilitated without the introduction of major railway equipment tonnages, are so repaired.

VII. CONSTRUCTION:

1. Construction is limited to the provision of minimum essential operational facilities which can not be established in existing buildings and facilities.

2. Army commanders employing appropriate service forces made available to them make minimum necessary repair of port, base, signal communication and air facilities, and construct hospitalization in occupied areas. Emphasis is placed on the restoration of required port facilities to operative condition and the provision of hospitalization at the earliest possible date.

3. Bulk petroleum storage and distribution systems normally are not constructed but will be limited to the use of existing facilities, repaired as needed to meet military requirements, and augmented as may be necessary, with barges and tankers with shore connections. Necessary distribution lines will be installed, with tankage, to distribute Avgas to operating air strips.

4. Appendices setting forth details of base facilities to be established in occupied areas are to follow.

VIII. SHIPPING DESIGNATORS:

<u>Port</u>	<u>Shipping Designator</u>
FUSAN	To be announced later
JINSEN	To be announced later
NAGASAKI	HARK
NAGOYA	EARN
OMINATO	BUNK
OSAKA	CLUB
OTARU	OBEY
OTOMARI	DUPE
SEISHIN	To be announced later
TOKYO	BULL
YAWATA	LACE
YOKOHAMA	EVIL

IX. MISCELLANEOUS:

1. Maximum use is made of available local installations, civilian labor and disarmed Japanese military personnel. Civilian labor will be obtained and employed through agencies and under regulations as prescribed by Military Government agencies in the occupied areas.

2. Appendix A, "AIR DROPPING OF EMERGENCY SUPPLIES TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES OF UNITED NATIONS" sets forth details of air dropping of emergency supplies and clothing to Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees of United Nations held in known Japanese Camps.

[REDACTED]

A N N E X 5a  
Communication Plan  
"BLACKLIST"

1. DIRECTIVE:

This plan covers the signal communications for operations of United States Army and attached forces under CINCAFPAC control, subsequent to sudden collapse or surrender of the Japanese Government or High Command, to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA, establish control of armed forces and the civil population, and impose thereon those prescribed terms of unconditional surrender that require immediate military action.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. (1) That normal command, administrative, and liaison communications will be functioning between the communications zones of CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, and to headquarters of theaters and major supporting forces not directly participating in "BLACKLIST".

(2) That normal signal communications systems required for cooperative action between CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, and the UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE will be functioning throughout "BLACKLIST".

b. That in the initial stages of the operation the following headquarters will be established and operating as follows:

CINCAFPAC - MANILA

Advance Echelon - TOKYO

CINCPAC - GUAM

UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE - GUAM

14TH AIR FORCE - KUNMING

7TH ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WING -

MANILA (as announced)

[REDACTED]

SIXTH U. S. ARMY - LUZON

Advance Echelon-OSAKA

EIGHTH U. S. ARMY - LEYTE

Advance Echelon - TOKYO

TENTH U. S. ARMY - OKINAWA

Advance Echelon - KEIJO, KOREA

FAR EAST AIR FORCES - MANILA

Advance Echelon - TOKYO

ARMY FORCES, WESTERN PACIFIC - MANILA

ARMY FORCES, MIDDLE PACIFIC, HONOLULU

- c. (1) That Naval Forces will install, operate, and maintain all naval communication facilities unless otherwise directed.
- (2) CINCPAC will install, operate, and maintain at Advance CINCAFPAC in the objective area, the signal communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of orders, information, and intelligence between the Advance Headquarters of CINCAFPAC in the objective area, and the appropriate headquarters and elements of CINCPAC.
- (3) That CINCPAC will provide such signal communication facilities and personnel at Advance Headquarters of CINCAFPAC in the objective area, as may be required to keep CINCAFPAC promptly informed of all matters affecting the progress of the naval phases of the operations.

d. That existing signal communication facilities in the objective area will be so disrupted by aerial bombardment and sabotage activities that it will be necessary to provide the necessary signal communication equipment, supplies, construction material, and troops to accomplish the missions

[REDACTED]

described by paragraph 3c (1)(b) of the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex.

e. That plans will be completed under the provisions of paragraph 3b (1) of the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex whereby adequate communications for cooperative action between all forces will be assured.

f. That the 7TH ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WING will establish such ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATION facilities and radio and radar navigational aids as may be required in the objective areas.

g. The UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE will provide the signal supplies, equipment, and personnel required for UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE purposes in the "BLACKLIST" area.

3. OPERATIONS:

a. General:

- (1) In general, signal communication facilities for "BLACKLIST" provide channels of communication between Headquarters, CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE, SIXTH U. S. ARMY, EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, TENTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, USAFWESPAC, USAFMIDPAC, and the designated elements of the initial occupational forces.
- (2) Safeland air courier service is provided to areas as designated.

b. SIXTH U. S. ARMY, EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, TENTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, and USAFWESPAC install, operate, and maintain the communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of orders, information, and intelligence between their respective headquarters and Headquarters, CINCAFPAC and Advance Echelons thereof, wherever located.



[REDACTED]

c. Tasks:

- (1) The several Army Commanders insure the provision of signal communication facilities required to accomplish the tasks assigned to them in the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex, and in addition, within their respective areas:
  - (a) Insure the provision of an integrated inter-communication system between Air, Ground, and Naval Forces in the objective areas for such intelligence, supply point, liaison, line of communication, defense, fighter control, and aircraft warning purposes as may be necessary.
  - (b) Assist the Commanding Officer, 7TH ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WING in the establishment of such ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATION facilities and radio and radar navigational aids as may be required by the FAR EAST AIR FORCES.
  - (c) Provide communications as required for the operation of so much of the railway system as may be required for operational and supply purposes, both civil and military.
  - (d) Be prepared to render the Naval Forces necessary assistance in the initial establishment of naval communications therein.
  - (e) Insure the provision of such signal communication services as may be required for Military Government purposes.

[REDACTED]

(2) FAR EAST AIR FORCES:

(a) Provides the signal communications, aircraft warning services and air navigational facilities required for:

1. Accomplishment of the tasks assigned in the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex.
2. Air operational intelligence, air command, and liaison purposes with the UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE, 14TH AIR FORCE, and air units of CINCPAC.
3. Air Force purposes in the cooperative action between land-based and carrier-based aircraft, and between other elements of the Air Forces of CINCAFPAC and the Air and Naval Forces of CINCPAC.

(b) Provide maximum possible assistance to the several Army Commanders in their respective areas of control, in the construction of airdrome communication facilities to insure the rapid accomplishment of missions assigned in the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex.

(3) U. S. ARMY FORCES, WESTERN PACIFIC:

Provide the signal communication facilities required for the tasks assigned in the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex, and in addition, those required:

(a) For a mobile communication system to

- [REDACTED]
- serve the Advance Headquarters, CINCPAC.
- (b) By the Regulating System, Headquarters, CINCPAC, for the movement of shipping from UNITED STATES, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, PHILIPPINES, and AUSTRALASIAN bases.
- (c) For assisting the several Army Commanders in the establishment of such communication services as may be required for Military Government purposes.

4. LOGISTICS:

- a. Signal supply, in general, is from the UNITED STATES and supply establishments in the objective area augmented as practicable from MIDPAC and WESPAC.
- b. WESPAC provides the signal supplies, equipment, and construction material required for "BLACKLIST".
- c. MIDPAC provides the signal supplies, equipment, and construction material required to accomplish the missions assigned in paragraph 3b.(3)(a)6 of the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex.
- d. FAR EAST AIR FORCES provides the signal supplies and equipment for FAR EAST AIR FORCES technical purposes in accordance with existing directives.

5. PLANS:

- a. SIXTH U. S. ARMY, EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, TENTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, and USAFWESPAC prepare and submit to CINCPAC communications plans and requests for signal supplies, equipment, and personnel to accomplish the tasks enumerated in paragraph 3c above, on or prior to dates specified in relevant instructions from this headquarters.
- b. Central Bureau and Section 22 submit their respective plans for radio intelligence, and radio and radar countermeasures to CINCPAC by dates as specified by the Chief

[REDACTED]

Signal Officer.

c. Plans and directives for coordination of radio frequencies and call signs among forces concerned will be issued by this headquarters at an appropriate time.

6. APPENDIX: For diagram of principal channels of signal communication, see Appendix 6, attached hereto.



ANNEX 5 b

"BLACKLIST"

Assumed Terms  
of Surrender

DIGEST OF ASSUMED TERMS OF SURRENDER

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2. Application of Surrender Terms	(1)
3. Summary of Surrender Terms	(2-12)
a. Instruments of Surrender	(2)
b. Orders and Proclamations	(3-12)
4. Enforcement of Surrender Terms	(13)

APPENDIX 4 - ENFORCEMENT OF SURRENDER TERMS

1. General	1
2. Authority to order use of Sanctions and Reprisals	2
3. Employment of Punitive Measures	2-4

1. General.

This Annex contains certain assumed terms of surrender relating to military matters which require immediate post-surrender action by Occupation Forces. These terms follow drafts submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 15 February 1945 by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and which, insofar as is known, remain in a tentative status. Minor amendments to these drafts have been made to conform to the command structure subsequently established in the Pacific by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It may not be assumed that this Annex represents the final form of the included documents in event formal surrender occurs. It may be anticipated that terms imposed upon the Japanese will conform in principal thereto.

Political, economic, financial and military government matters will be subsequently covered as necessary basic policies are determined.

2. Application of Surrender Terms.

Operation "BLACKLIST" may be put into effect either as a result of formal surrender of the Imperial Japanese Government or High Command or alternatively, on the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific for areas in which hostile armed forces have either capitulated or been overpowered.

a. In event of formal surrender the Instrument of Surrender will be most general in nature and cover only the essentials of surrender. It will be necessary to issue further detailed orders and instructions to the Japanese authorities regarding numerous matters upon which they will be required to take action immediately after they have signed the Instrument of Surrender. These instructions take the form of Proclamations, General and Special Orders by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.

[REDACTED]

b. In event of there being no formal surrender, or that local surrenders or capitulations occur prior to formal surrender, the objectives outlined in the "BLACKLIST" Plan are accomplished as rapidly as the situation permits. In this case, Orders and Instructions by the various echelons of command conform to the following policies:

- (1) Orders are clearly and expressly limited to immediate military objectives.
- (2) No commitments of any kind are made by United States or attached forces.
- (3) Orders are expressly subject to any general Instrument of Surrender which may be later imposed.
- (4) All orders are given some title which emphasizes their purely local character.

Within these limits the orders issued by Army or subordinate Commanders are based upon drafts contained in this Annex, omitting such parts as are obviously inapplicable.

c. Sanctions and reprisals which may be used in enforcement of terms of surrender are outlined in Appendix 4, hereto, Enforcement of Surrender Terms.

### 3. Summary of Surrender Terms.

#### a. Instruments of Surrender.

The basic Instrument of surrender and accompanying Imperial Rescripts will in all probability consist of acknowledgement by the Emperor of JAPAN and the Japanese Imperial High Command of the total defeat of the Japanese armed forces and the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces and people. The Emperor of JAPAN and the Japanese Imperial High Command undertake to cause all Japanese armed forces wherever situated, and the Japanese people, to cease hostilities forthwith and to comply with all requirements imposed by the Commanders of the United Nations forces occupying the various areas concerned. All Japanese civil and military officials are directed to obey and enforce such requirements, and to remain at their posts and continue to perform their duties until relieved by the Commander of the Occupying Forces concerned.



[REDACTED]

b. Orders and Proclamations

- (1) An initial proclamation by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific to the people of JAPAN Proper, the RYUKYUS, KOREA (and other areas of AFPAC responsibility as assigned) will cover the following points:
- (a) The fact that the Emperor of JAPAN and the Japanese Imperial High Command have acknowledged the defeat of all Japanese armed forces on land, sea and in the air and have surrendered unconditionally.
  - (b) That the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific assumes supreme legislative, executive and judicial power and authority within KOREA, JAPAN Proper to include adjacent off-shore islands, KARAFUTO and TSUSHIMA ISLAND, the RYUKYUS (and other areas of responsibility as assigned).
  - (c) That all civil and military officials in the above areas shall remain at their posts until further notice and continue to perform, under his authority, their normal official functions.
  - (d) That all Japanese officials, other Japanese, and persons of other nationalities resident in occupied territories shall comply with all proclamations, orders or other instructions issued or to be issued under authority of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
  - (e) That all civil police shall continue their normal function and will be held personally responsible for the maintenance of law and order in their respective districts. That they shall not, however, interfere in any way with the personnel of the Occupying Forces. That all employees of public utilities and services shall remain at their posts and continue to perform

[REDACTED]


their duties unless otherwise directed by authority of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.

- (f) That the peoples of occupied territories are directed to carry on their usual occupations and peaceful pursuits subject to such controls as may be imposed by authority of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
  - (g) That both authorities and people are directed to abstain from all acts detrimental to the interests of the nations at war with JAPAN, the maintenance of public order and orderly administration, and to the security and welfare of the Occupying Forces and the agencies of the nations at war with JAPAN.
  - (h) That any organization or individual failing to render full cooperation with the Occupying Forces, or failing to comply fully with any proclamations, orders or other instructions that may be issued as above provided, will be promptly and severely punished.
  - (i) That Commanders of Armies of the United States assigned territorial jurisdiction by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, have power to issue Orders, Proclamations and Instructions by authority of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, covering the above matters, and shall have power to delegate such authority to their subordinates as they may deem appropriate.
- (2) A General Order covering implementation of the surrender of military and naval forces will include the following provisions relating to Japanese forces wherever located.

[REDACTED]

In implementation of these provisions by Japanese Forces located outside areas of AFPAC responsibility, it is assumed that the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific will be designated to coordinate and to enforce upon the Japanese Imperial High Command insofar as its own action is concerned, the demands of the various Allied Commanders concerned.

- (a) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall retain all forces in their current positions, pending instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
- (b) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall disarm immediately and completely all armed forces wherever they may be situated, and shall deliver intact and in good condition all weapons and equipment at such times and at such places as may be designated by Commanders of the respective Occupying Forces. Pending further instructions, the civil police will be exempt from these provisions. They shall remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for maintenance of law and order in districts where located. The strength and arms of such police forces will be prescribed by Commanders of the respective Occupying Forces.
- (c) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall, within 48 hours of the time of receipt of the order, furnish the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific complete information as follows:

- 
1. Lists of all land, air and antiaircraft units, showing locations and strengths, officers and men.
  2. Lists of all aircraft (military, naval and civilian), giving complete information as to number, type, locations and condition of such aircraft.
  3. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels (surface and submarine) and auxiliaries, in or out of commission and under construction, giving their position, condition and movement.
  4. Lists of all Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over 100 gross tons, in or out of commission and under construction, including ships acquired after 7 December 1941 from non-Japanese sources, giving their position, condition and movement.
  5. Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps, showing locations and layout of all mines, mine fields, and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith.
  6. Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, antiaircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.
  7. Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees and the numbers of persons detained in each.

[REDACTED]

(d) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall direct at once all Japanese aircraft (military, naval and civilian) to remain on the ground, on the water or on board ship, and that the Japanese Imperial High Command shall be held responsible that these aircraft so remain until disposition is made of them by the Commanders, Occupying Forces of the area where located.

(e) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall be held responsible for the following:

1. All ammunition, warheads, torpedoes, bombs, depth charges and other explosive material on board Japanese naval vessels at sea, shall be rendered harmless and thrown overboard 48 hours after receipt of this Order. In the case of vessels not at sea, it shall be discharged and placed in safe storage ashore within the same time limits.
2. There shall be no movement of Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval vessels in ports or harbors at time of surrender, except at the direction of or with the express approval of the Commander, Occupying Forces of the area where located.
3. All Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval vessels which are at sea shall be prepared to put into specific ports or proceed to rendezvous according to schedules and in the manner prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the Allied Nations exercising strategic jurisdiction over waters where located at time of the surrender of the Japanese Government.

- 
4. All naval vessels formerly belonging to any of the United Nations at war with JAPAN which are in Japanese hands shall be returned to their former owners in good condition at times and to ports specified by instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
  5. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over 100 gross tons, including merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the nations at war with JAPAN, which are now in Japanese hands, shall be prepared to proceed on dates and to ports specified in instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
  6. No damage to or destruction of the vessels and ships described in this Section, or to port facilities and material shall be permitted.

(f) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall be responsible for the following:

1. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea and air, wherever located, shall be removed within fourteen (14) days from the receipt of the order.
2. All aids to navigation shall be re-established at once.
3. All safety lanes shall be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of 1. above.

(g) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall:

1. Cause to be held intact and in good condition, and subject to disposition by the Commander, Occupying Forces, of the area where located:

[REDACTED]

a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies, and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material (except as specifically prescribed in sub-paragraph (b) above).

b. All transportation and communication facilities and equipment, by land, water, or air.

c. All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.

d. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of all implements of war and other material and property used by or intended for use by military or para-military organizations in connection with their operations.

2. Furnish the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, within fourteen (14) days after receipt of order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraphs 1., a., b. and d. of this Section, indicating the numbers, type and location of each.

- [REDACTED]
3. Furnish at the demand of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, the labor, services and facilities required for the maintenance or operation of any of the facilities and equipment mentioned in sub-paragraph 1 of this Section, as well as any information or records that may be required in connection therewith.
  4. Cease forthwith the manufacture, import or export of arms, ammunition and implements of war.
  5. Dismantle and destroy, subject to such priorities and in accordance with instructions prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, such installations and establishments described in sub-paragraph 1. c. of this Section, as may be designated by him.

(h) That the Japanese Imperial High Command and appropriate Japanese officials shall:

1. Accept full responsibility for the safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and Civilian internees, and maintain the essential administrative, supply and other services for such prisoners of war and civilian internees, including the provision of adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care, until otherwise locally directed by the Commander, Occupying Forces of the area where located.
2. Deliver each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, together with its equipment, stores, records, arms and ammunition, to the command of the local United Nations camp leader, senior



1

[REDACTED]

officer or designated representative of the  
prisoners of war and civilian internees concerned.


3. Incarcerate without delay and report to the  
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces,  
Pacific, all personnel of Japanese nationality who  
have been employed as guards, wardens, examiners or  
administrators at Prisoner of War or Civilian  
Internment Camps since 7 December 1941 at which  
United Nations personnel have been held.
4. Furnish, within fourteen (14) days of receipt  
of order, complete lists of all United Nations  
prisoners of war and civilian internees in-  
dicating their location.

(i) That the Japanese Imperial High Command and  
appropriate Japanese officials shall:

1. Aid and facilitate the occupation of such places,  
areas, or regions or parts of the Japanese Empire  
and areas occupied by Japanese forces as may be  
designated.
2. Prohibit and prevent forthwith the development,  
manufacture, importation and exportation of arms,  
ammunition and implements of war.
3. Cause the delivery of all arms in the possession of  
the civilian population (in areas of AFPAC re-  
sponsibility) to Commanders designated by the  
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.

(j) That the Japanese Imperial High Command and the  
appropriate Japanese officials are informed that,  
wherever reference is made to all Japanese land, sea  
and air establishments, equipment and personnel, such  
reference shall include those which are Japanese or  
Japanese-controlled, wherever they may be found.

(k) That the Japanese Imperial High Command and all  
Japanese officials are warned that drastic penalties  
will be inflicted immediately in the event of:

- 
1. Any delay or failure to comply with any of the above provisions.
  2. Any delay or failure to carry out completely such additional requirements as a Commander, Occupying Forces, may prescribe within his designated area of responsibility.
  3. Any action which, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, might be detrimental to the nations at war with JAPAN, or any one of them.

- (3) General orders issued at appropriate times by designated Commanders of Occupying Forces in the several areas in which Japanese forces are located, will provide for evacuation of Japanese armed forces personnel and their civilian auxiliaries to JAPAN Proper. These orders will provide that such movements of personnel will conform to schedules established by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, or his designated successor. They will prohibit and prevent:
  - (a) The forced evacuation of any non-Japanese inhabitants.
  - (b) The harming of such inhabitants or damage to their property.
  - (c) The removal of animals, stores of food, forage, fuel or other provisions or commodities.
  - (d) Pillage, looting and other unauthorized destruction of any kind.

Such personnel evacuated will abandon on the spot and intact all port material, material for inland waterways (including tugs and lighters), barracks and quarters and other property not required for maintenance of personnel during sea passage.

The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, or his designated successor, will demobilize such personnel upon their arrival within JAPAN Proper subject to such exceptions as he may deem necessary.

[REDACTED]

4. Enforcement of Surrender Terms.

(See APPENDIX 4, ANNEX 5 b, ENFORCEMENT OF SURRENDER  
TERMS, attached hereto.)

LIBRARY  
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

"BLACKLIST"

ENFORCEMENT  
OF  
SURRENDER TERMS

1. GENERAL.

a. It is probable that there will be resistance in some form or another to the terms of surrender and to the orders, ordinances and bans given by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. Under these circumstances, it may be necessary to impose certain sanctions or to employ reprisals. These are imposed in accordance with the provisions of FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare.

b. Definitions.

(1) Sanctions.

The Instrument of Surrender will provide for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for compliance on the part of the enemy with the regulations, orders, bans and ordinances promulgated by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. The measures which may be taken to enforce these terms are properly described as sanctions. They include:

- (a) The judicial and disciplinary measures vested in the commander of an occupying force in time of war by international law. Such measures are employed to discipline individuals in unorganized evasion of the terms of surrender and/or disobedience to the orders, ordinances and bans published by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. The application of these means is normally a function of Military Government officials. (See Basic Plan for Institution of Military Government, "BLACKLIST" Operations).

[REDACTED]

(b) Such exceptional military measures as may be necessary in the event of continuous and widespread evasion of the surrender terms and/or disobedience to such further orders, ordinances and bans as may be published by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. These measures are employed to punish small groups (military or civilian) of independently organized evaders of the surrender terms and violators of the orders, ordinances and bans promulgated by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. Application of these measures should be given wide publicity as a deterrent to other potential offenders. Such sanctions are not to be confused with standard military measures employed in the large scale reduction of an organized hostile military force.

(2). Reprisals.

Should no surrender take place or organized resistance be continued by elements of the Japanese armed forces or by civilians, the Occupying Forces may be compelled to enforce compliance with the rules of war on the part of such military personnel or civilians. Acts done for this purpose are properly termed reprisals; they are normally illegal and may only be resorted to in the event of the commission by the enemy of illegal acts of warfare.

2. AUTHORITY TO ORDER USE OF SANCTIONS AND REPRISALS.

Except as limited herein and by paragraphs 3c(1) and (2) and 3c(1), below, Army Commanders, respectively, within their assigned areas of responsibility, have authority to order the use of sanctions and

[REDACTED]

reprisals as appropriate, subject to such limitations as may be subsequently imposed by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. They may delegate their authority in this matter within prescribed limits to insure the timely application of such measures. Neither reprisals nor sanctions, apart from judicial or disciplinary measures, may be employed except as a last resort when all other efforts to enforce the terms of surrender or compliance with the Laws of War have failed. In no case are reprisals taken against prisoners of war.

3. EMPLOYMENT OF GROUP SANCTIONS AND REPRISALS.

a. Forced Evacuation of Communities.

In cases of recurrent sniping or similar action against the security of the forces of occupation, of such character that specific offenders cannot be identified and organized community participation of some sort is apparently involved, evacuation of all or part of the city, town or village in which the hostile action ~~occurred~~ may be enforced as deemed necessary to make such action effective.

b. Destruction of Communities.

If the measures described in subparagraph a, above, prove ineffective or should their implementation involve a disproportionate danger to the forces of occupation, the destruction of all or part of a city, town or village may be resorted to either by bombing, or by artillery fire, or by burning. An operation of this type should not be resorted to unless sufficient notice has first been given to the inhabitants to permit their prompt evacuation of the area. The use of bombing is discussed in paragraph c, below.

c. Bombing.

Conditions may arise where serious or widespread hostile acts are being committed by hostile elements. Under such circumstances, bombing or other forms of air action may be employed as a military measure, subject to the following conditions:

- [REDACTED]
- (1) The decision to resort to air action rests with the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific.
  - (2) If, in the opinion of an Army Commander, security of elements of the Occupation Forces requires such action (within the capacity of the Air Forces within his area) in such haste as to preclude reference to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, he directs such action and air elements involved comply. Full reports of this action are made to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, and Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, respectively, by the most expeditious means. The Army Commander does not subdelegate such responsibility for air action.
  - (3) The following principles govern the use of air action within the capacity of the occupying air forces:
    - (a) Immediate application of the attack as soon as the requirement arises.
    - (b) The continuation of the attack at high intensity until the object has been achieved.
    - (c) Disregard of danger to civilian property which may be incidental to air action against a military target in the vicinity.
    - (d) Extensive publicity on air action which has been taken, as a deterrent to other offenders.
    - (e) Confinement of air action to the area in which hostile acts are being committed.

d. Destruction of Private Property.

Private property which has been illegally used for sniping or other hostile action may be destroyed if such action is considered necessary for the security of the Occupation Forces or as a deterrent to the enemy.

[REDACTED]

e. Hostages.

- (1) Hostages may be taken as a further means of enforcing group or community obedience to terms of surrender or compliance with the Laws of War. The taking of hostages is in no case resorted to without the authority of the Army Commander concerned. Such authority is not subdelegated. The execution of hostages is not regarded with favor and requires the specific authority of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, in each case.
- (2) One of the applications of the use of hostages after initial occupation of the area is to force them to accompany military parties into buildings or areas which, after being cleared or inspected, are suspected of having been subsequently illegally mined or booby-trapped; or to compel them to ride on trains or other forms of transportation liable to be damaged by illegal acts of sabotage in occupied territory.
- (3) In the event authority for taking hostages is granted, they are selected in an equitable manner and notification of such selection given to the community. This notification contains an announcement as to the proposed use of the hostages involved, and a statement that the consequences of any illegal acts will fall upon such hostages.



BASIC PLAN FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL

OF THE

ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY RESOURCES

OF THE ENEMY

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BASIC PLAN FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL OF THE ARMED  
FORCES AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE ENEMY

1. OBJECTIVES.

a. Establishment of control of the armed forces and military resources of the enemy constitutes a first charge on the resources of Army Commanders within their assigned areas of responsibility in order that:

- (1) Continuation of hostilities by organized elements of the armed forces of JAPAN is prevented and their renewal rendered impossible.
- (2) The Occupying Forces, Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees, and the interests of Nations at war with JAPAN, are safeguarded.
- (3) Law and order are maintained and conditions created which facilitate both the establishment of the Post-Hostilities Military Government and Army of Occupation, and the transfer of the responsibilities of Army Commanders thereto.

b. The terms "armed forces of JAPAN" and "Japanese armed forces" as employed herein include all Japanese and Japanese-controlled Army and Naval Forces (in areas of AFPAC responsibility) including their respective Air Forces and auxiliaries, and quasi-military organizations.

2. CONCEPT.

a. The provisions of this annex apply under conditions of surrender or submission of Japanese armed forces with their command and logistic organizations more or less in a functioning condition. Operations to induce surrender or submission on the part of major organized elements of the hostile armed forces constitute a continuation

[REDACTED]

of the war and are conducted on that basis. On the other hand, the disarmament and handling of unorganized masses of stragglers are conducted under normal prisoner of war procedures until demobilization as covered herein, is instituted.

b. Activities to establish control of armed forces which have surrendered or submitted are conducted by Army Commanders in and from the areas occupied in Phases I, II and III, as outlined in the Text of this Plan. Army Commanders take such measures as they may deem necessary to accomplish the objectives enumerated in paragraph (1) above, subject to such instructions and controls as may be from time to time specified by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific. In so doing, they exercise within their assigned areas of responsibility, the powers and rights vested in the Commander of an Occupying Force in time of war by international law as outlined in FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare.

c. In the establishment of control and subsequent demobilization of the Japanese armed forces, the existing Japanese command structure is perpetuated under strict U.S. control for such period as may be convenient to accomplish the objectives of demobilization. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, exercises direct control of Japanese Imperial Headquarters and provides for its abolishment at the earliest practicable date consistent with its employment to facilitate general demobilization. Army Commanders control and dispose of command echelons on the Army Group and comparable level for Japanese armed forces within their respective areas of responsibility. Control and disposition of subordinate headquarters may be sub-delegated by Army Commanders as is appropriate.

d. Army Commanders, in general, require the Japanese to disarm their own forces, segregate and secure equipment and supplies and maintain discipline within their armed forces personnel. They require civil police and guards to safeguard munitions plants and stocks of munitions and raw materials not yet under Armed Forces control. They selectively demobilize armed forces personnel. Upon reversion of

[REDACTED]

armed forces personnel to a civilian status they become the responsibility of the Military Government structure operating under Army control.

3. COMMAND AND CONTROL.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC. - Command of Occupation Forces in assigned areas.

Relations with the Japanese Government and Imperial Headquarters.

Relations with agencies outside areas of assigned responsibility.

SIXTH ARMY ) - Control and disposition of enemy armed forces.

TENTH ARMY )

EIGHTH ARMY )

Control of military establishments, industrial plants and stock piles of equipment, supplies and raw materials as necessary pending final disposition.

Military government of the civil population.

Arrangements with the United States Navy for disposition of naval vessels, establishments, equipment and supplies as directed by CINCAFPAC.

FAR EAST AIR FORCES

- Land-based air support as requested by Army Commanders, subject to such limitations as may be established by CINCAFPAC.

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES  
WESTERN PACIFIC


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES  
PACIFIC FLEET (As arranged with  
CINCPAC)

- Seizure, care and disposition of Japanese Army and Navy Air Force equipment, supplies and installations as requested by Army Commanders.
- Logistic support of occupation forces.
- Disposition of captured Japanese war material as requested by Army Commanders.
- Minimum necessary logistic support of Japanese Armed Forces personnel upon request of Army Commanders.
- Naval support of punitive operations, details as arranged with Army Commanders.
- Naval control of coastwise traffic, details as arranged with Army Commanders.
- Care and disposition of captured Japanese naval vessels, equipment and supplies.
- Investigation, care and disposition of occupied Japanese Naval shore establishments.

4. TASKS.

a. General Tasks.

- (1) Summarily immobilize and disarm the Japanese armed forces.
- (2) Seize, collect, inventory, maintain and safeguard and/or dispose of Japanese military and naval material, equipment, supplies and records not essential to the maintenance, administrative and subsistence requirements of the Japanese Armed Forces maintained in being.
- (3) Promptly destroy or scrap all enemy military equipment not suitable for peacetime civilian use, with the following specific exceptions:
  - (a) Items of military equipment, newly developed which are desired for examination or research.
  - (b) Equipment Army Commanders require for operational needs.
- (4) Retain enemy equipment not essentially or exclusively for use in war which is suitable for peacetime civilian use, for:
  - (a) The maintenance and subsistence of the occupation forces, Allied prisoners of war and civilian nationals of the United Nations.
  - (b) The relief of the local civil population to the extent necessary to prevent or alleviate epidemic or serious disease and serious unrest or disorder which would endanger the occupying forces and the objectives of occupation.
- (5) Maintain a record of the location, type, quantity, condition and disposition of all enemy equipment:
  - (a) Seized and retained, and
  - (b) Seized and destroyed.

- 
- (6) Take all practicable measures to prevent the use of aircraft as a means of escape of individuals or evacuation of property.
- (7) Destroy all military and civil aircraft and aircraft replacement parts, components and equipment including armament, bombs and missiles except those items which Army Commanders believe merit special examination and which they may order secured for such examination.
- (8) Selectively segregate, detain and/or demobilize Japanese armed forces and/or individuals as rendered desirable by considerations of security, apprehension of war criminals, demands for rehabilitation of communications and housing, and the maintenance of a minimum subsistence level for the population.
- (9) Pending instructions relative to final disposition, render inoperative but preserve Japanese and Japanese controlled war industries and their stocks of unfinished and raw materials.
- (10) Re-establish and maintain overland and sea communications essential for the operation of Occupation Forces.
- (11) Suspend the operation of all Japanese military laws, ordinances, regulations and practices inimical to the safety of the Occupying Forces and Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees, and to the interests of Nations at war with JAPAN.
- (12) Apprehend and detain for subsequent disposition, all designated and suspected war criminals.
- (13) Require the maintenance of discipline among personnel of the Japanese armed forces, imposing such punishment to this end as may be permitted by the Rules of


[REDACTED]

Land Warfare.

b. In accomplishment of the tasks enumerated in 4 a, above, the Army Commander may require commanders and personnel of the Japanese armed forces, in accordance with Surrender terms, to:

- (1) Comply with requirements of the Occupation Forces, and to remain at their posts and continue to perform their normal duties under his authority until relieved by him.
- (2) Carry out such tasks as he may assign, including formulation and implementation of such plans and orders as may be required to insure accomplishment.
- (3) Submit all orders, regulations, ordinances, etc., to him for approval prior to dissemination.
- (4) Prohibit, abstain from and prevent the promulgation of any orders or any activities inimical to the Occupation Forces, Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees, and Nations at war with Japan; including destruction, removal or concealment of military and naval personnel, documents, materials, and equipment.
- (5) Disseminate and enforce as directed, the proclamations, orders, ordinances and other instructions of the Army Commander or his designated representative through appropriate echelons of their commands.
- (6) Maintain discipline within the Japanese armed forces.
- (7) Deliver to designated representatives of the Army Commander prescribed arms, military materials equipment, supplies and records in the possession of or under the control of Japanese armed forces. Pending delivery, remove from the hands of troops, segregate, render harmless, preserve in operative condition and secure such arms, materials and equipment.



- 
- (8) Establish and define safety lanes through all mined areas, both on land and sea, and subsequently render ineffective, explode or remove all mines and other obstacles to travel by land, sea and air.
  - (9) Restore, maintain and/or operate facilities for overland and sea communications.
  - (10) Maintain the logistic support of Japanese Armed Forces.
  - (11) Maintain, safeguard and operate as directed, military establishments and installations.

c. In the exercise of his military government functions, the Army Commander should utilize the personnel of the Japanese armed forces as necessary and appropriate in the maintenance, restoration and operation of such of the following services as he may deem essential to establish or preserve minimum levels of subsistence, prevent disease and epidemics, facilitate maintenance of law and order, or serve the interests of the Occupying Forces:

- (1) Public utilities.
- (2) Police and fire fighting services.
- (3) Sanitation and public health facilities and services.
- (4) Distribution agencies for subsistence and other basic commodities.
- (5) Basic industries, factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories and testing stations.
- (6) Agriculture and fishing and other sources of subsistence.
- (7) Other desired activities.

##### 5. ADDITIONAL MEASURES.

In addition to the measures enumerated above, Army Commanders take such other measures as they may deem desirable or necessary, construing their powers broadly within the rights and limitations established

[REDACTED]

by the Rules of Land Warfare and subject to such limitations as may be imposed by CINCPAC.

6. APPENDICES.

a. For uniform standards for disarmament of Japanese Armed Forces, see Appendix 6 a, hereto.

b. For Outline Plan establishing uniform standards for demobilization of Japanese armed forces Personnel, see Appendix 6 b, hereto.

"BLACKLIST"

Uniform Standards  
for  
Disarmament  
of  
Japanese Armed Forces

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1. Scope of Disarmament.

a. Complete disarmament (subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 below) of mobile Regular Japanese Armed Forces is effected as a matter of highest priority. Base and Z.I. echelons are disarmed as rapidly as practicable.

b. Arms of Homeguards, auxiliaries and other para-military organizations, etc., are collected through their own organizations insofar as is practicable.

c. Remaining arms of personnel of the above organizations are collected in connection with the disarmament of the civilian population under Military Government procedures.

2. Types of War Materials Initially Relinquished by the Japanese.  
(with exceptions as indicated in paragraph 3 below).

a. Rifles, carbines, muskets, revolvers and pistols of all calibres.

b. Heavy, medium and light machine guns, heavy light and medium automatic guns and machine pistols of all calibres, their carriages, mountings and accessories.

c. Guns, howitzers, mortars and spigot projectors of all natures and calibres, as well as their carriages, mountings and accessories. All rocket apparatus, breechless or recoilles guns and flame throwers, their carriages, mountings and accessories.

d. Projectiles, fixed ammunition and cartridges, filled and unfilled, for the weapons in a, b and c, above, and all fuses, tubes or contrivances to explode or operate them.

[REDACTED]

e. Grenades, bombs, mines, demolition charges, rockets and self-propelled projectiles of all kinds, smoke, artificial mist, incendiary and chemical charges of all types, filled or unfilled; all means for exploding or operating them.

f. Bayonets, swords, daggers, lances and other side arms.

g. Armored fighting vehicles including tanks, armored cars and self-propelled guns; multi-axled motor vehicles, wheeler, tracked or semi-tracked designed for military use. All types of special military vehicles such as wireless, ammunition, bridging or mobile workshops.

h. Mechanical and self-propelled carriages for any of the weapons listed in the above categories.

i. Railway rolling stock especially adapted for war purposes.

j. Armor of all types used for protective purposes in war.

k. Transport vehicles (prime movers and trailers, wheeled, tracked or semi-tracked), of any type used for war purposes. Pack military equipment.

l. Range finding, sound ranging and acoustic apparatus; aiming and computing devices for fire control, including predictors and plotting apparatus; direction-of-fire instruments; gun sights; fuse setters; calibration equipment of all kinds for the calibration of guns, fire control, radio and all other types of equipment for war purposes.

m. The following types of signal equipment:

- (1) All radio/wireless transmitting sets and/or transceivers with ancillary equipment held by formations below Army Headquarters and at corresponding Naval Commands, subject to such exceptions as Army Commanders prescribe.
- (2) All secrecy equipment whether designed for wire or radio.
- (3) All code and cipher systems including cipher machinery and secret writing and equipment, with full information regarding their method of working.
- (4) Copies of all signal documents.

- [REDACTED]
- (5) Copies of all frequency allotments.
  - (6) All Radar equipment.
  - (7) All military and civil radio broadcast and communications stations.
  - (8) All signal dumps of the field armies.
  - (9) Other air signal equipment as designated by Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.
  - (10) Other naval signal equipment as may be indicated by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.
- n. Searchlights and their means of direction and control.
  - o. Monoculars, binoculars and telescopes for war purposes.
  - p. Military survey instruments and all equipment for flash spotting, sound ranging or any other means of detecting and locating guns, mortars or rockets.
  - q. Maps, map reproduction material and survey data specifically adapted for military purposes.
  - r. Engineering tools, equipment, plants and stores specially adapted for military purposes. Bridging material of military types on fixed or floating supports, infantry footbridges, pneumatic boats, assault boats and assault boat motors.
  - s. All camouflage, dazzle and decoy devices.
  - t. Propellents, explosives, pyrotechnics, liquified gases, and any components destined or suitable for the propulsion, explosion, charging, filling of, or use in connection with, the war material in the above categories.
  - u. Asphyxiating, lethal, toxic, incapacitating or similar substances and products in any form intended or capable of being used for war purposes. All contrivances, weapons and containers intended for their use, storage or transport.

[REDACTED]

v. Gas masks and collective protective devices for military purposes and all defensive equipment (including chemicals and clothing) whether for individual or collective use, which are capable of being used to detect or protect against the military use of chemical agents.

w. Gasolines, oils and greases used for the operation or maintenance of any of the war materials previously mentioned.

x. Other Japanese Army Air Forces war materials as designated by Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.

y. Other Japanese Navy war materials as may be indicated by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

3. Types of War Materials Retained by the Japanese as Required to Serve the Interests of the Occupation Forces.

a. Minimum number of rifles together with ammunition for same required for authorized armed guards.

b. Cargo trucks for supply purposes on a scale consistent with availability and minimum requirements.

c. Staff cars for administrative use by officers on a scale consistent with availability and minimum requirements.

d. The minimum number of engineer, signal, railway and medical services unarmored technical vehicles required to maintain authorized lines of communication and to care for the sick and wounded.

e. Horse drawn vehicles may be retained, together with horses, mules and the necessary type harness therefor.

f. All signal equipment except that outlined in sub-paragraph 2 m above.

g. Necessary maps may be retained for administrative purposes.

h. Engineer tools, equipment, bridging material, plants and stores, necessary to maintain authorized lines of communications.

i. Necessary gasoline, oils and greases for two weeks operation of vehicles which are not placed in dumps.

j. Japanese Army Air Forces war materials as designated by Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.

[REDACTED]

k. Japanese Navy war materials as may be indicated by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

1. All remaining war materials and stores required for administrative purposes as not specifically delimited in sub-paragraph 2 above.

ANNEX 5c

"BLACKLIST"

Procedure for Demobilization  
of Japanese Armed Forces  
Personnel

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1. Mission:

To demobilize completely the Japanese armed forces and their auxiliaries as expeditiously as the situation permits, consistent with having the demobilization take place in an orderly and controlled manner, and with due regard to needs of employing certain elements of the disarmed Japanese forces on reconstruction work, destruction of fortifications, and disposal of enemy war materials and plants in Japanese home islands and possessions and in occupied territories.

Secondary objects of demobilization are:

- a. To prevent evasion of demilitarization.
- b. To convince the Japanese nation of the Allied determination to allow Japan no further recourse to armed force.
- c. To screen military personnel, from a security viewpoint, particularly with a view to arresting war criminals and others ordered to be detained.
- d. To obtain and dispose of Japanese military records as ordered by higher authority.
- e. To avoid an unacceptable strain on the economic system of Japan.

2. Concept:

- a. That repatriation of personnel of the Japanese armed forces and auxiliaries into Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu from whatever source is controlled by CINCAFPAC.
- b. That conduct of operations to demobilize the Japanese armed forces is decentralized to commanders of Army areas, so far as is practical.
- c. That commanders of Army areas establish concentration areas for control and documentation of personnel of the Japanese armed forces and auxiliaries.



d. That commanders of United States Army areas establish a Depot Area Headquarters in each of the Japanese Depot Division areas. The Depot Area Headquarters is the operating agency for documentation, discharge and transfer of personnel of the Japanese armed forces and auxiliaries.

e. That the Japanese armed forces are speedily moved into or attached to concentration areas to facilitate control and administration. This does not apply to those held in prisoner of war camps and those left in administrative positions to carry out instructions of CINCAFPAC and designated commanders. Personnel other than those held in prisoner of war camps are under control of their own officers working under Allied supervision and are administered through Japanese armed force channels.

f. That lines of communications and transportation disrupted by aerial bombardment and sabotage will have been repaired sufficiently to facilitate movement of Japanese armed forces from concentration areas to home areas.

g. That the demobilization of that portion of the Japanese armed forces available for discharge requires that the discharge be effected with the least possible delay consistent with an orderly return to civil life, in order to obviate the possibility of large scale desertion.

h. That a period of about two months will elapse before the Armies of Occupation can be fully deployed within their respective areas.

3. Responsibility:

a. CINCAFPAC is responsible for:

(1) Preparation of a statistical review of the Japanese armed forces and the collation of information to insure complete and orderly disbandment of the Japanese armed forces.

(2) Initiation of procedure for disposal of non-Japanese

personnel in the Japanese armed forces.

- (3) Repatriation of Japanese armed forces and auxiliaries into Honchu, Shikoku and Kyushu.

b.. Commanding Generals of United States Armies are, within their respective areas, responsible for:

- (1) Establishment of the necessary number of concentration areas to facilitate control, documentation and discharge of personnel of the Japanese armed forces and auxiliaries.
- (2) Establishment of Depot Area Headquarters in each Japanese Depot Division area to administer documentation, discharge and inter-area transfer of Japanese armed forces personnel.
- (3) Expeditious movement of personnel of the Japanese armed forces and auxiliaries within their Army area to concentration areas.
- (4) Documentation of personnel of all services of the Japanese armed forces and auxiliaries, calling upon the CINCPAC and Commanding General FEAF for such advice and assistance as may be required.
- (5) Discharge of all personnel of all services and auxiliaries whose residences are within their Army area, whether they are located within it on cessation of hostilities, or subsequently transferred to it in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 4c below.
- (6) Collection and registration of deserters and stragglers of the Japanese armed forces who have disbanded themselves or been disbanded without authority.
- (7) Disposal of non-Japanese personnel in the Japanese armed forces as directed by CINCAFPAC.
- (8) Submission to CINCAFPAC of nominal and strength returns for personnel of the Japanese armed forces in

accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 4b below.

c. The Commanding General, AFWESPAC, is responsible for logistical support of demobilization procedure.

4. Procedure:

a. General:

- (1) Administrative Organization for discharge is as indicated in diagram, (Inclosure #1).
- (2) CINCAFPAC announces when demobilization procedures are to begin and from time to time issues broad policy directives on the subject.
- (3) Priority for discharge within general directives from CINCAFPAC is established by commanders of Army areas giving due consideration to:
  - (a) Security.
  - (b) The demands for personnel of the Japanese armed forces to carry out essential labor for the occupying forces.
  - (c) Pressing civilian requirements for skilled and semi-skilled labor for purposes of reconstruction.
- (4) General discharge of personnel is geared to the ability of the area concerned to receive the discharged personnel.
- (5) The fullest possible use is made of Japanese military machinery and personnel working under United States Armed Forces supervision in carrying out every stage of the documentation and discharge procedures.
- (6) Concentration areas are, in general, established on the basis of one or more for each Japanese Depot Division area. Japanese recruiting is accomplished by depot areas and pertinent records.

if not previously destroyed, should be found in the headquarters of each depot area. Fullest use is made of such records as well as military machinery inherent in depot areas to accomplish demobilization.

- (7) Personnel are discharged in the locality of family residence if both it and the area of the last responsible recruiting office are recorded as being in the same Depot area. If they are in different Depot areas, the area of responsibility of the last competent recruiting office governs for the purpose of discharge or inter-area transfer, subject to inter-area agreement.

b. Statistical preparation for Demobilization:

- (1) At the earliest possible moment after cessation of hostilities, Commanding Generals of Army Areas will require that appropriate commanders of Japanese armed forces and auxiliaries within their Area prepare returns, under U. S. Armed Forces direction for all personnel, male or female, awaiting discharge or disposal, whether such personnel be prisoners of war held in Japan, disarmed troops segregated in concentration areas or disarmed troops to be utilized for essential labor for the U. S. Armed Forces and not to be immediately demobilized. All personnel, regardless of category or priority of discharge are documented. Arrangements will be coordinated by CINCPAC for documentation of units and prisoners of war held in areas outside of Japan proper.
- (2) The statistical system comprises:
  - (a) Nominal and strength returns prepared in con-

centration areas and prisoner of war camps.

- (b) Statistical Analysis, to insure complete demobilization, prepared from the nominal and strength returns by CINCAFPAC.

(3) The forms to be used for nominal and strength returns and for statistical analysis with a statement of their function and method of their disposal, are listed below:

- (a) Area Control Form #1 (Inclosure #2), a periodical nominal roll to be prepared in quintuplet by each unit and formation. Personnel are listed alphabetically by rank, sex and service on each roll. Distribution: Original and first copy to CINCAFPAC second copy to Depot Area Headquarters, third copy retained at Concentration Area or Prisoner of War camp, fourth copy retained at unit or formation.
- (b) Area Control Form #2 (Inclosure #3), a periodic strength analysis showing Service or Auxiliary organization, broken down into Officers, Officials, Enlisted Men, other ranks, male and female. This form is prepared in triplicate, the original and first copy to accompany Area Control Form #1 to Depot Area Headquarters, the second copy to be retained at Concentration Area or Prisoner of War Camp. This report is consolidated at Depot Area Headquarters and the consolidation forwarded to Army Area Commander.
- (c) Area Control Form #3 (Inclosure #4) a periodical increase and decrease statement showing all changes since last submission, broken down

into Officers, Officials, Enlisted Men, other ranks, male and female and the resulting current strength. This return is submitted to Depot Area Headquarters at such intervals as the Depot Area Commander may decide. This form is completed initially by all units and formations, and is submitted to Concentration Area or Prisoner of War Camp Headquarters. These headquarters prepare a consolidation of these forms, supporting this consolidation by the appropriate Area Control Form #4 extracted from the Concentration Area or Prisoner of War Camp files for each increase except those acquired through transfer, and for each decrease. Control form #4 is endorsed to show change of status.

The forms and their consolidation are then forwarded to Depot Area Headquarters, accompanied, if desired, by Area Control Form #2, to show current strength. Depot Area Commanders consolidate Area Control Form #3 and the consolidation is forwarded to the Army Area Commander. A consolidation of Form #3 is prepared by Army Area Headquarters and forwarded to CINCPAC if requested.

- (d) Area Control Form #4 (Inclosure #5), Personal data sheet to be prepared in triplicate for all personnel, male and female. Distribution: Original to Depot Area Headquarters first copy retained at Concentration Area or Prisoner of War Camp, second copy retained with unit or formation. When forwarded to Depot Area Head-

quarters, these forms are arranged in the same order as the personnel listed on Area Control Form #1.

- (e) Area Control Form #5 (Inclosure #6), a return of Japanese nationals held in Depot Areas by Industrial or Professional Group, location, residence and availability is prepared by Depot Area Headquarters and submitted to Army Area Commander as requested.
- (f) Area Control Form #6 (Inclosure #7), a return of non-Japanese nationals by nationality and service is prepared by Depot Area Headquarters and submitted to Army Area Headquarters as requested by Army Area Commander. A consolidation of forms #6 is forwarded to CINCPAC.
- (g) Preparation of Area Control Forms #1 thru 6 may be decentralized as deemed desirable and additional reports instituted as required.

c. Inter-Area Transfers:

- (1) Depot Area Commanders discharge only personnel whose residence, as indicated by the location of their last competent recruiting officer, is within their own area. Personnel resident in other Depot Areas are transferred there as early as may be practicable.
- (2) The transfer of personnel from one Depot Area to another, both Depot Areas being within the jurisdiction of the Army Area Commander, is effected under the direction of the Army Area Commander.
- (3) The transfer of personnel from a Depot Area within

one Army area to a Depot area within a different Army Area is coordinated by the Army Area

Commander from whose Area the transfer is being made

(4) The following documents accompany personnel transferred to other Areas:

(a) Area Control Form #4.

(b) All individual personnel records held in the unit and all military documents normally in the possession of the individual.

(c) A Medical certificate that the individual is free from vermin and infectious and contagious diseases.

d. Disposal of non-Japanese Personnel:

At the earliest possible moment after the rendering of the returns referred to in par. 4c above, non-Japanese nationals serving with the Japanese armed forces and auxiliaries are statistically and, where possible, physically segregated from Japanese in National Groups to await disposal as directed by CINCAFPAC.

e. Stragglers, Deserters, Personnel discharged without authority, Civilians:

(1) In order to effect the collection and documentation of personnel who have discharged themselves or been discharged without authority, CINCAFPAC, at the appropriate time, publishes a General Order requiring all such personnel to report by a certain date to selected centers to be specified by Army Area Headquarters or by Depot Area Headquarters. This order will include those auxiliary personnel whom it is intended to discharge through the service machinery. It is provided that those reporting will not be subject to disciplinary action for desertion or other stated irregularities, but



[REDACTED]

Appendix 6b to ANNEX-5c (Cont'd)

failure to comply with the order will entail severe penalties.

- (2) Civilians who are not a part of the Japanese armed forces and are not held in custody as Prisoners of War and who are not in uniform but who may have been organized into groups to support the Japanese armed forces or resist invasion, are allowed, after disarmament, to disperse to their homes without being disbanded through service machinery. Those taken into custody in uniform, or held as Prisoners of War, are disbanded as members of the Japanese armed forces.

f. Discharge Procedure:


- (1) Japanese Service troops are retained as long as may be necessary to insure a satisfactory administration of Japanese and non-Japanese personnel awaiting disbandment and to meet such other Japanese military commitments as may be decided upon by U. S. Armed Forces authorities.
- (2) Japanese technical personnel needed to store, catalogue, recondition or destroy Japanese war material are retained until their tasks are completed.
- (3) On receipt of a directive from CINCPAC, discharge of personnel begins.
- (4) Certain priority categories of personnel are first discharged. These categories may include:
  - (a) Personnel for work in certain public utility service.
  - (b) Personnel for work in transportation services.
  - (c) Agricultural workers.
  - (d) Personnel for work in certain classes of building trades.

- (e) Such other specialist personnel as may be required by Army Area Commanders.
- (5) Thereafter if circumstances permit, general discharge may begin on the basis of the returns mentioned in par. 4b above. The flow is regulated by coordination between Army and Military Government Staffs.
- (6) Personnel who reside in other Depot Areas, no matter to what discharge category they belong, are transferred to their Area of residence as soon as practicable in accordance with instructions issued under par. 4c above.
- (7) Personnel released for discharge are processed in accordance with the Administrative Provisions for Discharge (Inclosure #8). The place where this is done may be the Prisoner of War Camp, Concentration Area, or such center as the Depot Area Commander may consider it convenient to establish.
- (8) Counter-intelligence staffs, if they so require, are given prior information of proposed discharges in order to enable them to carry out such checks as they deem advisable.
- (9) In order to avoid the spread of infectious diseases, medical examination of all personnel is carried out immediately prior to discharge or transfer to another Depot Area.
- (10) On completion of the Discharge procedure, each individual is given a paper containing notes and instructions for his use at the time of discharge. This paper, Discharge Form D1 (Inclosure #9) must be read by the individual before he completes Part I of the Discharge Certificate, Discharge Form

D2 (Inclosure #10).

- (11) The discharge certificate is non-military in character. Part I is completed by the individual to whom it relates, Part II by a Medical Officer, Part III by a U. S. Armed Forces Discharging Officer, who stamps the certificate with a suitable impressed seal.
- (12) Upon discharge, personnel are dispatched, if possible, by rail, road or water transport, to their homes. Troops are not permitted to march home in formed bodies.
- (13) Each man, upon arrival at his destination, is required to produce his discharge certificate in order to obtain his civilian ration card and/or such other documents as he may be required by Military Government to hold.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION FOR DEMOBILIZATION OF  
THE JAPANESE ARMED FORCES





STRENGTH RETURN OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL

\*HELD IN CONCENTRATION AREA \_\_\_\_\_  
\*PRISONER OF WAR CAMP \_\_\_\_\_  
\*DEPOT AREA \_\_\_\_\_  
\*U. S. ARMY AREA \_\_\_\_\_

S E R I A L	Service or Aux- iliary Or- ganization	Offi- cers	Offi- cials	EM	Other Ranks	Females	Total
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	ARMY						
2	NAVY						
3	ARMY AIR FORCE						
4	NAVY AIR FORCE						
5							
6	(A LIST OF						
7	AUXILIARY						
8	ORGANIZA-						
9	TIONS WILL						
10	BE PRINTED						
11	HERE)						
12							
13							
14							
15							
16							
17							
18							
	TOTALS						

\*Delete that which is inapplicable. GRAND TOTAL

SIGNATURE OF  
\_\_\_\_\_  
COMMANDER.

NAME AND RANK OF COMMANDER  
(In Block Latin Capitals)

Inclosure No. 4  
to Appendix 6b  
AREA CONTROL FORM NO. 3

INCREASED/DECREASE STATEMENT OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

UNIT \_\_\_\_\_  
LOCATION \_\_\_\_\_  
\* CONCENTRATION AREA \_\_\_\_\_  
\* PRISONER OF WAR CAMP \_\_\_\_\_  
\* DEPOT AREA \_\_\_\_\_  
\* U. S. ARMY AREA \_\_\_\_\_  
AS OF \_\_\_\_\_ (DATE)

1. STRENGTH LAST RETURN (DATE)	Officers	Officials	EM	OR	Females	TOTAL
* (a) Transfers from other Concentration Areas/PW Camps in Depot Areas						
* (b) " " " Depot Areas in Army Areas						
(c) " " " Army Areas						
(d) Other Increases						
2. TOTAL INCREASES						
3. (a) Transfers to other Concentration Areas and PW Camps in Depot Areas						
(b) " " " Depot Areas in Army Areas						
(c) " " " Army Areas						
(d) Discharges						
(e) Other Decreases						
4. TOTAL DECREASES						
CURRENT STRENGTH						

\* Delete that which is inapplicable.  
(WHEN PRINTED, THIS FORM WILL BE IN JAPANESE AND ENGLISH)  
Signature of Commander \_\_\_\_\_

NAME RANK of Commander in BLOCK LATIN CAPITALS

TO BE COMPLETED IN TRIPLICATE. ALL ENTRIES WILL BE MADE IN BLOCK LATIN CAPITALS AND MUST BE IN INK OR TYPESCRIPT. NO SPACE IS TO BE LEFT BLANK.

PERSONAL  
DATA SHEET

Inclosure No. 5  
to Appendix 6b  
AREA CONTROL FORM NO. 4

1	SURNAME	2	RESERVED FOR HEAD- QUARTERS USE ONLY.	3	SERVICE X	4	TRADE BY SPECIAL OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY # LETTER NUMBER
---	---------	---	--	---	-----------	---	--

5	OFFICERS $\phi$	12	NATIONALITY PRESENT AND PAST	16	NEXT OF KIN CHRISTIAN & SURNAMES
	EM OR WOMAN				
6	CHRISTIAN NAMES	13	LAST COMPETENT RECRUITING OFFICE		RELATIONSHIP
7	SERIAL NUMBER				PLACE STREET, ETC.
8	NO. OF IDENTITY DISC	14	HOME ADDRESS PLACE STREET	17	AGE IN YEARS TO NEAREST BIRTHDAY
9	UNIT			18	FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY CHANGE OF STATUS
10	LOCATION OF UNIT	15	FAMILY STATUS $\phi$ SINGLE MARRIED WIDOW(ER) DIVORCED		
11	MILITARY OCCUPATION				

NOTES:  $\phi$  Check that which is applicable. (WHEN PRINTED, THIS FORM WILL BE IN ENGLISH AND JAPANESE)  
X Insert 'ARMY', 'NAVY', 'ARMY AIR FORCE', 'NAVY AIR FORCE', or 'AUXILIARY ORGANIZATION'.  
# Insert appropriate letter and serial number from Special Occupation Index.



NOMINAL RETURNS OF JAPANESE NATIONALS BY INDUSTRIAL OR PROFESSIONAL GROUPS

\* HELD IN CONCENTRATION AREA

\* DEPOT AREA

\* PRISONER OF WAR CAMP

\* U.S. ARMY AREA

S E R I A L	Industrial or Professional Group (a)	Surname	Given name (b)	Middle Initial	Rank (c)	Serial Number (When Applicable) (d)	Residence (e)	Avail ability (f)	Group Total (g)
1									
2	(A list of industrial or professional groups will be furnished as the needs are determined)								
3									
4									
5									
6									
7									
* Delete that which is inapplicable									GRAND TOTAL:

Signature of Commander

Name & Rank of Commander

RETURN OF NON-JAPANESE NATIONALS BY SERVICE OR  
AUXILIARY MILITARY ORGANIZATION LOCATED IN  
DEPOT AREA .....IN.....ARMY AREA

As Of \_\_\_\_\_  
Date

*SERVICE
-----

S E R I A L	NATIONALITY	NUMBERS	
1	(An agreed list of NON-JAPANESE		
2	NATIONALS will be printed in		
3	this column)		
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
	TOTAL		

\* Insert ARMY, NAVY, ARMY AIR FORCE, NAVY AIR FORCE, AUXILIARY ORGANIZATION.

(WHEN PRINTED, THIS FORM WILL BE IN ENGLISH & JAPANESE)

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS FOR DISCHARGE

1. General

- (a) The following regulations are intended to govern the administrative provisions for the discharge of members of the JAPANESE armed forces and auxiliaries.
- (b) They supersede all JAPANESE regulations for a similar provision.
- (c) For the purpose of these regulations, the "day of discharge" is defined as the day on which Part III of the individual's Discharge Certificate is signed by U. S. Armed Forces discharging authority.

2. Pay

- (a) Army Pay calculated in the normal way, according to the relevant pay group, made up to and including the day of discharge and for half a month thereafter, is paid to each man or woman on discharge.
- (b) Disbursement of funds by the JAPANESE Service Authorities is the subject of scrutiny by Allied Authorities on every possible occasion.
- (c) No claims for over or under payment of pay or allowances, brought either by the JAPANESE Service Authorities or by individual JAPANESE are recognized by the U. S. Armed Forces Authorities.

3. Rations

Haversack rations for the journey from the place of discharge to the place of residence are supplied to each individual at the time of his discharge.

4. Food and Clothing Ration Cards.

- (a) Each individual is informed at the time of his discharge of the arrangements for the issue of food and clothing ration cards (Discharge Form No. D.1).

- (b) No ration card of any sort will be issued to discharged personnel except on production of a completed Certificate of Discharge (Discharge Form D.2).

5. Travel

Each man, on discharge, is issued a travel warrant to his place of residence. Such warrants are issued in accordance with regulations to be published later.

6. Clothing

- (a) Each individual is allowed to retain, without payment, after discharge, the following items of clothing:

- 1 Field Cap
- 1 Field Jacket
- 1 Pair Long Cloth Trousers
- 1 Belt and Buckle
- 1 Pair Boots or Shoes
- 1 Pair Braces (if desired)
- 1 Greatcoat
- 2 Shirts
- 2 Pair Underpants
- 2 Pair Socks
- 2 Handkerchiefs.

- (b) In addition to the above, one blanket per man may be issued.
- (c) Deficiencies of clothing in relation to the scale in (a) and (b) above may be made up from local stores, if any are available.
- (d) All insignia and badges of rank are removed from clothing retained, prior to the departure of the individual.

INSTRUCTIONS TO PERSONNEL ON DISCHARGE

1. You have received the last payment which will be made by JAPANESE armed forces authorities for service with JAPANESE armed forces organizations. Pay has been computed up to and including the day of discharge and for half a month thereafter.
  2. (a) On arrival at your destination, you will report, with your Discharge Certificate, to the local police station.  
There you will receive:
    - (I) A Civil Identity Card.
    - (II) Instructions on registration at the local employment office.
    - (III) Instructions for obtaining ration cards.
  - (b) Failure to report at your local police station will result in investigation and punishment.
  3. You will not be registered for employment nor will you receive food and clothing ration cards except on production of your discharge certificate.
- [REDACTED]

CERTIFICATE OF DISCHARGE

Inclosure #10 to  
Appendix 6b  
CONTROL FORM # D.2

ALL ENTRIES WILL BE MADE  
IN BLOCK LATIN CAPITALS  
AND WILL BE MADE IN INK  
OR TYPESCRIPT.

PERSONAL  
PARTICULARS

SURNAME OF HOLDER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE OF BIRTH \_\_\_\_\_  
DAY, MONTH, YEAR  
CHRISTIAN NAME \_\_\_\_\_ PLACE OF BIRTH \_\_\_\_\_  
CIVIL OCCUPATION \_\_\_\_\_ FAMILY STATUS - SINGLE  
MARRIED  
HOME ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_ WIDOW (ER)  
DIVORCED  
\_\_\_\_\_  
NUMBER OF CHILDREN WHO ARE MINORS

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY  
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF THE PARTICULARS  
GIVEN ABOVE ARE TRUE.

I ALSO CERTIFY THAT I HAVE READ AND  
UNDERSTOOD THE "INSTRUCTIONS TO  
PERSONNEL ON DISCHARGE" (CONTROL FORM #7)  
SIGNATURE OF HOLDER \_\_\_\_\_

NAME OF HOLDER IN  
BLOCK LATIN CAPITALS \_\_\_\_\_

II  
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE

DISTINGUISHING MARKS \_\_\_\_\_  
DISABILITY, WITH DESCRIPTION \_\_\_\_\_  
MEDICAL CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_

I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE  
AND BELIEF THE ABOVE PARTICULARS RELATING  
TO THE HOLDER ARE TRUE AND THAT HE IS NOT  
VERMINOUS OR SUFFERING FROM ANY INFECTIONS  
OR CONTAGIOUS DISEASE.


SIGNATURE OF MEDICAL OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_

NAME AND RANK OF MEDICAL OFFICER  
IN BLOCK LATIN CAPITALS \_\_\_\_\_

III  
THE PERSON TO WHOM THE ABOVE PARTICULARS  
REFER WAS DISCHARGED ON \_\_\_\_\_  
(DATE OF DISCHARGE)

FROM THE \_\_\_\_\_

RIGHT  
THUMBPRINT



OFFICIAL  
IMPRESSED  
SEAL

CERTIFIED BY \_\_\_\_\_

NAME, RANK AND  
APPOINTMENT OF ALLIED  
DISCHARGING OFFICER  
IN BLOCK LATIN CAPITALS \_\_\_\_\_

DELETE THAT WHICH IS INAPPLICABLE  
INSERT "ARMY" "NAVY" "AIR FORCE"  
AUXILIARY MILITARY ORGANIZATION

(WHEN PRINTED THIS FORM WILL BE IN ENGLISH AND JAPANESE)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

ANNEX 5. d.

BASIC INTELLIGENCE PLAN

"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS

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[REDACTED]

## SECTION I

### INTRODUCTION

1. This memorandum contemplates intelligence measures in a transitory situation where Japan agrees to surrender; no absolute demarcation in operational requirements is possible between: a) combat, b) pre-surrender and c) surrender phases. A transient situation permits local provisional measures but the long range effect of further occupations, at a later date, must be considered.

2. This memorandum defines broad intelligence responsibilities though delegation of certain functions is already provided for or contemplated.

3. General intelligence problems will be enormously magnified, in contact with a fanatical population; there are no docile natives, as on New Guinea or a pro-American population, as in the Philippines; every Japanese national is an enemy; all intelligence may become operational intelligence; sabotage and under-ground resistance are doubly menacing because of complicated language and race psychology. All intelligence agencies must face this sinister background and re-orient their general activities; an acute shortage of language personnel requires close coordination of functions in the language field.

4. During the transitory phases, there will be certain general tasks connected with intelligence; the majority of them may be started simultaneously by the appropriate intelligence staffs; they are set out in an estimated order of priority:

- a. The immediate seizure of Intelligence Objectives.
  - b. The arrest and/or Intelligence control as specified by C-in-C AFPAC of:
    - (i) Persons whose names appear on suspect Lists.
    - (ii) All General Staff Corps officers (and equivalent Naval and air officers) who have not been taken into custody as prisoners of war. (See Section X).
    - (iii) Persons in certain specified positions of authority; officials of certain prescribed organizations, viz:
      - Supreme Military Council
      - Cabinet Ministers
      - General Staff (Army & Navy)
      - Staffs of Military Districts (Army & Navy)
      - Staffs of Staff College (Army & Navy)
      - Staffs of Military and Naval Academy (Army & Navy)
      - Staffs of Training and Depot Establishments (Army & Navy)
      - Political Assn. of Greater Japan (Dai Nippon Seiji Kai)
      - \* Kempei Tai (Military Police)
      - \* Tokumu Kikan (Army-Navy Secret Intell. Service)
      - Koku Sui-To (Extreme Nationalist Party)
      - Chizakura (Nat. Party - Manchuria)
      - \* Kokuryu Kai (Black Dragon Society)
      - Nissho, and related Extremist or Terrorist Societies
      - Teikoku Zaigo Gunjin Kai (Imp. Reserve Assn.)
      - Sotei Dan (Union of Able Bodied Men)
      - Shonen Dan (Youth Assn.)
      - Seinen Dan (Young Men's Assn.)
  - c. The destruction of the Japanese organization (\*) for espionage, sabotage and subversive activities.
  - d. Survey of the organizations of the Japanese Armed Forces to facilitate demobilization and disarmament.
  - e. Survey of Japanese Military, scientific and technical developments and their application to peace and war.
  - f. Preservation and scrutiny of documents and archives in order to acquire maximum knowledge of Japanese methods and organization.
  - g. Organization for the censorship of civil communications Japan.
5. The classification of categories of P.W. or civilian suspects, under Par. 4B (iii) above, emphasizes the joint character of operational



[REDACTED]

intelligence (O.I.) and counter-intelligence (C.I.); the use of joint interrogation and translation centers, civilian internment camps adjacent to PW camps, preparation of standard questionnaires giving guidance on O.I. and C.I. interrogations and the selection of certain P.W. and suspects, for more intensive investigation, etc, suggest themselves as indispensable joint measures. (See Section X)

6. There is an identity of interest between operational intelligence counter-intelligence and public safety (as represented by Military Government, the Provost Marshal, etc.)

It is essential that at all levels there should be complete unanimity on policy and that collaboration in action is continuous. This can be accomplished by the formation of joint committee of representatives of Theater G-2, Army or District G-2, Counter Intelligence, Provost Marshal General and Military Government, to be known as J.C.I.S., (Joint Committee on Intelligence Security).

7. In order to carry out these tasks, it will be necessary for all the Services to reorganize their Intelligence facilities and to make additional Intelligence personnel available. The guiding principle is that, so far as is practicable, continuity in personnel, methods and channels should be observed.

It is anticipated that the operational stage will lead gradually into "Blacklist" condition; in such circumstances it will be necessary for similar Intelligence Plans to be put into effect either partially or wholly during the operational stage in occupied areas, in analogous situations under "Olympic" and "Coronet".

## SECTION II

### CONDITIONS IN JAPAN AFTER COLLAPSE OR SURRENDER

1. Since the Japanese, as a nation, have not previously experienced an overwhelming defeat terminating in either collapse or unconditional surrender, no precedent is available for guidance; the problem is largely one of Japanese psychology not readily appreciated by the Western mind. Historically, Japanese have surrendered unconditionally to other Japanese; as a nation they have bowed to the demands of Western Powers in situations involving a threat of war; they have at least locally, suffered a high degree of disorganization as result of major disasters. It is not believed, however, that these experiences furnish a sufficient index by which the behavior and reactions of the Japanese population could be accurately measured.

2. Attitude of People and Officials under the conditions assumed in Par. 1 - a, of Basic Plan. The following discussions (\*) present aspects of the situation under several conceivable contingencies to gauge the attitude of people and officials, viz:

CASE a. Surrender of the Japanese Government  
Before Invasion of any of the Home Islands.

The administrative structure would be basically intact and the transfer of authority from the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese Government to the Allied Military Government would be in an orderly manner. Japanese administrative officers would be instructed by their Emperor to remain in office. A number sufficient to carry on essential functions would probably comply. Their efficiency would be low for some time, but that condition would have to be treated with some tolerance because it would be due primarily to factors such as: (1) great mental and emotional confusion over facing a situation without precedent in Japanese experience; (2) conditions arising out of air raid damages, including disruption of the chain of command from a centralized authority, loss of homes and relatives, and lowered physical condition.

The Japanese people would be in immediate need of food and shelter; they are amenable to direction and intrinsically obedient, and probably would comply with Allied orders and try to go about their daily tasks. Their efforts to help themselves would tend to be ineffective for a while, because there would be widespread confusion, both psychological and physical. It would be essential to forestall disorders arising out of dire need for daily necessities.

(\*) Dept. of State Extracts.

As a result of extensive bombing and fire damage, Japanese industry would be generally disorganized, transportation disrupted and the distribution of food seriously impaired. In such a situation many business and financial leaders would be willing to cooperate with the occupying forces in bringing some degree of order out of the existing chaos.

Beneath the surface there would soon be maneuvering among Japanese political elements, with various groups struggling to gain sufficient following to come forward in due course to build a new Japanese Government.

CASE b: The Japanese Government Surrenders  
After Invasion of One of the Home Islands Other than Honshu.

Under this assumption, conditions would be essentially the same as under case (a), except in the invaded area where confusion arising out of death and injury, lack of food and shelter, and the destruction of public utilities and other facilities would be greater.

CASE c: The Japanese Government Surrenders  
After the Invasion of Honshu.

Under this assumption, conditions would be similar to but still more confused than those under case (b). Administrative difficulties would be greater because of the increased degree of disruption to the chain of command from a centralized authority, there would be increased disruption of the Japanese economy, and a greater number of people would be affected by death and injury, lack of food and shelter and the destruction of public utilities and other facilities.

CASE d: The Japanese Home Islands Have Been Invaded and Organized Resistance Therein Has Ceased but the Japanese Government Has Not Surrendered and Has Gone Underground.

Under these circumstances, the occupation authorities would not have the advantage of assistance by the Emperor and the Japanese Government in bringing about a cooperative attitude on the part of the Japanese people and of Japanese administrative officials. It would be fruitless for the occupying forces to set up an interim Japanese Government to assist in this matter as its lack of constitutional authority would deprive it of influence. The factors leading to confusion, inefficiency and disorder would be at maximum strength and would require great efforts on the part of the occupation authorities to prevent chaos. Many administrative officials would refuse to continue in office under the direction of the Military Government. The lack of a mandate from a Japanese Government to stay at work and the probable issuance of orders to sabotage the Allied effort would aggravate the inefficiency and confusion of those continuing in office. This condition, plus almost complete disruption of the chain of command from a centralized authority and maximum disruption of the national economy would greatly increase administrative difficulties.

### SECTION III

#### GENERAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION

1. In connection with determining the intelligence organization of units involved in the occupation of JAPAN, the commander's mission and the characteristics of the population are of paramount importance. As to the former, the specific tasks assigned commanders are given in subpar 3.c. (1)(b), beginning on p 13, "Basic Outline Plan for 'Blacklist' Operations".

2. The general coordination and control of JAPAN are vested in the Commander-in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific. The areas of initial occupation, taken into our control in 3 Phases, are given in subpar 3.a. on p 8, "Basic Outline Plan". It should be noted that this same subpar indicates that other areas may have to be occupied.

3. Intelligence policy in all its aspects is formulated by General Headquarters. Armies are responsible for the detailed planning of the intelligence organization for their respective areas of occupation. They keep GHQ informed of the progress made in their planning, to ensure that they proceed along similar lines and that no divergencies occur which might create a gap in the overall picture.

4. a. It is evident that much larger intelligence organizations will be needed by occupation units than formerly sufficed in combat.

[REDACTED]

Suitable personnel will have to be selected from other staff sections and subordinate units.

b. The intelligence organization of a unit in an urban area will differ markedly from that of an identical unit in a rural area. It would therefore be impracticable to draw up uniform T/O&Es for the intelligence organizations of occupation units.

5. As plans are carried to the point where final estimates can be made of the intelligence personnel requirements of units, tentative selections thereof should be made or they may be requested from higher authority where they might be made available as in the case of CIC personnel.

#### SECTION IV

#### OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The Operational Intelligence Staffs within Armies will be confronted with a mass of information requiring analysis and evaluation for use by their own Disarmament and Disbandment Staffs. The main role of GHQ, AFPAC will be to supplement this information and produce Intelligence guidance on long-term policy. As usual, the greatest sources of information, collected locally by Armies, will be documents and interrogation reports.

2. The information will be required for various purposes, which can be broadly set out as follows:

- a. Tactical requirements.
- b. Planning requirements.
- c. Checking of information supplied by the Japanese.
- d. Technical Intelligence.
- e. Military Intelligence research.
- f. Air Reconnaissance.

3. TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS: Responsibility for Operational Intelligence in its present form will continue, probably on a diminishing scale. It will still be necessary for Intelligence Staffs to cover all aspects of tactical Intelligence required in establishing control over the Japanese armed Forces and in initiating their disarmament.

4. Intelligence Staffs will need to work in intimate contact with Counter Intelligence Staffs, who follow closely all matters connected with underground movements. They will also be required to follow the political trends in their areas. (See Sec. x)

5. PLANNING REQUIREMENTS: Intelligence Staffs will be required to provide the Intelligence on which the plans for the disarmament and disbandment of the Japanese armed forces are based. Work on this will probably prove the most onerous of Intelligence tasks. In certain areas, where almost all records have been destroyed, it may prove necessary to recreate such records as are required, by the use of interrogation reports.

6. CHECKING OF INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY THE JAPANESE: Japanese commanders will be instructed on surrender to submit immediately information regarding order of battle, locations, strengths, equipment and stocks. It will, however, be essential that such information be subjected to constant checks to prevent any attempts at evasion or concealment. For this reason, Intelligence Staffs continue to maintain their own order of battle and estimates.

7. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE: The normal tasks of Technical Intelligence will continue in the occupational period. After the cessation of hostilities, Technical Intelligence will have to search for what technical developments have been made and are being used in secret. In addition, Technical Intelligence will be required to help in certain disarmament problems. (See Sec. XIII)

8. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH: It will be necessary and advisable to initiate enquiries on:

- a. How Japan fought the war in all its army aspects.
- b. The accuracy of our own Intelligence estimates.
- c. The collation of certain long-term Intelligence, such as topography or engineer Intelligence.

9. AIR RECONNAISSANCE: The need for Air Reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, will remain. It will be devoted mainly to checking that

Japanese troop concentrations are being carried out as directed; that there is no unwarranted rail activity; and that dumps and installations are not being interfered with. Photographic interpreters will be required to continue their functions in this respect. Consideration should also be given to long-term plans for Air Reconnaissance for survey, topographical and other purposes.

## SECTION V

### THE HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS

#### THE PROBLEM OF DOCUMENTS:

1. In view of the peculiar dependence of the Japanese on the written record, every detail of military life and administration is committed to paper. The vital importance of intelligence obtained from captured Japanese documents has been realized, and directives have been issued on their seizure, exploitation, and processing. In the "BLACKLIST" period, the general principles of the inter-Service handling of documents hitherto in force will continue in accordance with GHQ SWPA SOPI No. 23, dated 8 September 1944, and GHQ AFPAC SOPI No. \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_ (in preparation).
2. As the occupation of Japan proceeds, documents will become available in greater quantity than ever before; they will be of much wider application than those found in countries previously occupied by the enemy, in that they will be essential in all aspects of Military Government.
3. During the operational phase, the main emphasis is immediate exploitation of documents of operational importance. The problem in any area of Japan in which organized resistance has ceased is of a different character. The continued evacuation of documents will prove impossible because of their great bulk and volume; it will be inadvisable because their removal would hamper the establishment of civil control, the process of disarmament and disbandment, and the tasks of research. It will, therefore, be necessary for Language Detachments to select for evacuation through normal channels to Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHQ, only such documents as are of immediate general importance. The remainder will, so far as possible, be left "in place" after arrangements have been made for their safeguarding. Documents which cannot be so left must be carefully collected in central repositories to await final disposition.
4. A great number of agencies will be searching for documents, and it is required that all such agencies register with the Army ATIS Advanced Echelon of the District in which they will be operating. It must be impressed on them that, although they are free to collect what documents they require, permission to take them out of the area must be obtained from the Army ATIS Advanced Echelon concerned, and the removal registered there. There are represented at GHQ AFPAC, many agencies who will require to see documents for action in Japan before they are evacuated.
5. The vast majority of documents will, however, remain "in place". It will therefore be necessary to notify all interested agencies of what is available and where it is to be found. This will be done by each Army ATIS Advanced Echelon preparing and circulating locally, lists of the documents available in their areas. Copies of these lists will be sent to ATIS GHQ, who will disseminate them as required.
6. There will be types of documents which can only be efficiently evaluated in Washington or which require detailed analysis and research. These classes of documents will be sent to ATIS GHQ for action.
7. A more difficult problem arises regarding the selection of documents which as a matter of policy must not be left in Japan. Such as those dealing with the war efforts and organization of the armed forces and the War Diaries and studies of the various campaigns. To leave such documents intact in Japan would give any future Japanese General Staff the groundwork for creating a fresh military machine and the data for an examination of their errors in strategy and tactics in this war. It will be necessary for all such documents to be specially listed and marked as documents that must eventually be evacuated or destroyed.

[REDACTED]

8. Special efforts will be made to secure all records and plans of the following:

- (i) The central Japanese government, Japanese military organizations, engaged in military research, and such other governmental agencies as may be deemed advisable.
- (ii) All police organizations, including security and political police.
- (iii) Japanese economic organizations and industrial establishments.
- (iv) Institutes and special bureaus established in Japan devoting themselves to race, political, and similar research.
- (v) Documents required by the various echelons of Japanese Government and Armed Forces Command in exercise of their functions under United States Control must remain accessible to the Japanese Authorities concerned.

**DOCUMENT PROCEDURE:**

9. A brief summary is given below of the policy to be adopted in handling documents:

- (i) All documents seized must be safeguarded.
- (ii) Only documents of immediate general importance will be evacuated. Those required by Japanese Government and Command Agencies operating under United States Control will remain accessible to Japanese Authorities concerned.
- (iii) Evacuation through established military channels ATIS GHQ.
- (iv) No documents will be removed by anybody without the permissions of the local ATIS Advanced Echelon.
- (v) Document so removed must be registered at the local ATIS Advanced Echelon.
- (vi) Location lists of documents will be circulated.
- (vii) The greatest care should be taken when removing documents to remove them in the order in which they are found, and to disarrange them as little as possible. It is especially important that documents dealing with any piece of machinery or equipment, e.g., Radar, should not be separated from the material to which they refer.
- (viii) Documents of purely C.I. interest, may be evacuated through C.I. channels. After exploitation by C.I. they will be passed to ATIS GHQ. C.I. may, if desirable, freeze any document important for Counter Intelligence operations, subject to the authorization of the senior Intelligence Officer at the headquarters concerned.
- (ix) All cryptographic documents will be expeditiously handled as prescribed in GHQ SWPA SOP No. 23, dated 8 September 1944, and GHQ AFAC SOP No. \_\_\_\_, dated \_\_\_\_ (in preparation).

**RESPONSIBILITIES OF GHQ AFAC:**

10. (i) Establishment of ATIS at GHQ AFAC, of Advanced ATIS at ADVON AFAC, and of an ATIS Advanced Echelon at Tokyo.
- (ii) Co-ordination of all matters of inter-Service relationship regarding documents.
  - (iii) Direction on the types of documents which must be left "in place" and those which are required for ultimate evacuation from Japan or destruction, as a matter of policy.
  - (iv) Arrangement for making available to the Navy of records required by them.
  - (v) Liaison with M.I.R.S., War Dept., on documents policy, problems and procedure.
  - (vi) Detailed analysis of documents as required.

- [REDACTED]
- (vii) Receiving and complying with requests for information on documents.
  - (viii) Supply of copies of documents held at ATIS Advanced Echelons.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMIES:

- 11. (i) Arranging for seizure and safeguarding of documents.
- (ii) Detailed planning for the handling of documents throughout their areas of responsibility.
- (iii) Establishment of such ATIS Advanced Echelons as may be required in addition to those Language Detachments and ATIS Advanced Echelons operating with Divisions, Corps, Armies, and Task Forces.
- (iv) Requisitioning for all equipment required in their areas, including microfilm and laboratory apparatus.
- (v) Action on requests for documents held locally, either by producing the original or copies.

#### TOKYO:

12. From the purely military point of view, the biggest and most important collection of documents should theoretically be found in Tokyo or vicinity. It may therefore be necessary to create an ATIS Advanced Echelon of suitable proportions, with adequate reproduction resources. This ATIS Advanced Echelon should initially be organized on an integrated basis, and will be established by GHQ AFAC under the G-2 Advance Section. GHQ AFAC will arrange for the supply of the necessary equipment.

#### NAVAL DOCUMENTS:

- 13. Naval documents will be transferred to Naval authority in accordance with arrangements between CINCAFAC and CINCIAC. (See Section VII)
- 14. Naval Intelligence is responsible for informing Army and Air Intelligence Staffs of any matters of military or air interest arising from Naval documents.
- 15. Documents of inter-Service interest exploited by Army or Air Staffs will subsequently, if applicable, be passed by them to the Navy.

#### AIR FORCE DOCUMENTS:

- 16. Air Force documents, including documents concerning the JAF Supply Services and the organization of the Japanese aircraft industry, must be transferred to the nearest Air Force or Air Corps Intelligence Officer. These will be processed through Air Force channels to ATIS.
- 17. As some JAF documents contain information of importance to ground forces, it is the responsibility of Air Intelligence to inform Intelligence Staffs of the contents of such documents and make them available for inspection or reproduction.
- 18. Documents other than Air Force documents which interest Air Intelligence will first be exploited by the Army Intelligence and will then be passed to the nearest Air Intelligence. These documents will be returned after exploitation through normal Army channels.

#### DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR DOCUMENTS:

- 19. Such documents in the custody of the protecting power (neutral) will be respected.
- 20. Documents not in the custody of the protecting power (neutral) will be guarded pending instructions from GHQ AFAC as to their disposal.
- 21. If substantial reason exists for believing diplomatic or consular premises were used for warlike operations, the protecting power (neutral) may be asked for permission to search the premises. If this permission is delayed unreasonably; CINCAFAC, will decide whether or not the search is to be initiated.

[REDACTED]

## SECTION VI

### INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND SUSPECTS

#### POLICY OF INTERROGATION:

1. In the BLACKLIST period, the shift in emphasis from the interrogation needs of Operational Intelligence to those of Counter Intelligence, will become more pronounced. An increase in the number of interrogators, trained in Counter Intelligence methods, if practicable, will therefore be required.

#### TYPES OF PERSONS TO BE INTERROGATED:

2. (i) Ordinary PW or disarmed Japanese of purely C.I. interest.
- (ii) Ordinary PW or disarmed Japanese with a C.I. background.
- (iii) Civilians, such as members of the Black Dragon or other terrorist societies, who have been arrested on C.I. instructions.
- (iv) Internees in concentration camps.
- (v) Technical, scientific, economic, financial, etc., experts.

#### ORGANIZATION OF ATIS INTERROGATION CENTERS:

3. ATIS GHQ will continue to operate at present location until such time as Japan is occupied by its permanent garrison. ATIS Language Detachments and CIC detachments, augmented by Japanese-speaking personnel, will normally remain with their organic tactical units. CIC units, however, may be reassigned according to the exigencies of the situation. ATIS units may be reinforced by teams and detachments of Divisions, Corps, and Armies not involved in the occupation. ATIS Interrogation Centers and Language Detachments will be given C.I. training, if practicable, and will be augmented by C.I. personnel so that each unit is capable of conducting both Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Interrogation.

4. Selectees for detailed interrogation will be sent to ATIS or ADVATIS. Special arrangements will normally have to be made, according to circumstances, for the interrogation of Japanese financial, economic, scientific, and other experts.

#### CIVILIAN INTERNMENT CAMPS:

5. When Japan has been fully occupied, or when Military Administrative Districts are set up in the rear of our advancing forces, internment camps for civilian suspects may be established as required by Army Commanders. The Intelligence control of these camps will be the responsibility of Intelligence staffs, to be allocated for the purpose by Army Commanders. It is desirable that internment camps should be set up in the immediate neighborhood of PW camps, to facilitate interrogation problems. Certain types of PW of C.I. interest may be segregated and held, pending instructions for their final disposal.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES OF GHQ AFPAC:

6. (i) Preparation of questionnaire giving guidance on O.I. and C.I. interrogation and the selection of suitable PW.
- (ii) The establishment of ATIS Interrogation Centers.
- (iii) The channel through which all requests for Intelligence from interrogation are submitted by U.S. agencies, outside GHQ.
- (iv) The channel through which Intelligence obtained from interrogation is passed back to U.S.
- (v) To co-ordinate when necessary the work of ATIS Interrogation Centers.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMIES:

7. (i) Setting up of the necessary interrogation facilities.
- (ii) Provision of interrogators. These men should be drawn from existing Army (Corps) interrogation personnel, and augmented by C.I. personnel.

NAVAL INTERROGATION:

8. Sec Section VII.

AIR INTERROGATION:

9. It is not generally intended that Air representation of AFIS Interrogation Centers established in Japan will consist of more than screening officers. Air Interrogators will be attached or given access to interrogation centers and internment camps, and will be given facilities to interrogate persons anywhere likely to be in possession of information of Air interest.

SECTION VII

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

1. In general, Naval intelligence activities in JAPAN Proper will be based upon the principles of complete access and full interchange of information between the Army and Navy, and that of prompt transfer of appropriate intelligence material to the Navy.

2. Detailed arrangements between CINCPAC and CINCPAC covering Naval intelligence activities in JAPAN Proper will be disseminated to agencies affected at appropriate times.

SECTION VIII

EXPLOITATION OF AIR INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. DEFINITIONS:

For general convenience, captured or surrendered installations, material, documents and persons of particular interest to the Air Force Intelligence organizations are referred to in this document as Intelligence Objectives or Targets.

The first Air Intelligence Objective becomes that of immediate neutralization of all aircraft and airborne weapons, in place, at the moment of surrender -- augmented by the further condition that all air flights of any nature must cease immediately, as of the moment of surrender, until effective control measures are established.

By exploitation of Intelligence Targets is meant the seizure, safeguarding, preliminary interrogation of persons and their subsequent processing; and the recording, preliminary scanning and subsequent processing of documents to the appropriate collating agency.

2. AUTHORITY:

Air intelligence targets to be investigated will include:

- a. Information necessary for the disarmament, demobilization and demilitarisation of the J.A.F. and its associated para-military associations.
- b. Intelligence Targets contributing to the termination of the war against JAPANESE satellites:
- c. Intelligence concerning the extent of JAPANESE-GERMAN interchange of scientific and technical developments.
- d. Intelligence check on the effectiveness of Allied air operations as well as a check on the accuracy and completeness of Air Intelligence estimates.
- e. Technical intelligence for research purposes.

3. ORGANIZATION:

Subject to coordination with AFIPAC, the Air Force will be responsible for:



[REDACTED]

a. Air Intelligence for disarmament purposes through appropriate channels to AFFAC.

b. Intelligence policy for air disarmament problems.

4. MACHINERY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT:

During this period, Intelligence Objectives will be exploited by:

a. Normal Air Intelligence gathering agencies now in the field, including Technical Intelligence and Air P/W Interrogation Teams.

b. By Staffs of U.S. Air disarmament formations.

Normal Air Intelligence gathering agencies, following the advancing armies will continue, as at present, to exploit Air Intelligence Objectives. After surrender or collapse of resistance, Air Intelligence agencies and staffs will be made available to disarmament staffs as circumstances require for specialized intelligence investigations.

5. EXPLOITATION OF INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES:

Intelligence officers will be attached to field formations of FEAF disarmament formations, when deployed, for the purpose of screening and reporting to higher headquarters. Intelligence staffs will determine by examination of Intelligence Objectives whether air documents should be evacuated or remain in place.

Target lists will be prepared by AFFAC and other Air Force agencies, particularly those concerned with Technical Air Intelligence.

Special operations may be mounted against particular cities or areas in which there are concentrated a large number of Intelligence Objectives. Special Army Detachments ("T Forces") may be organized to seize and guard Intelligence Objectives in these areas. Qualified air personnel, charged with the investigation of all Air Intelligence Objectives within these areas will be attached to teams of specialists and interrogators.

Where air teams are not available for exploitation of Air Intelligence Objectives, by arrangement with Armies, seizure of such objectives will be entrusted to local forces.

6. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE:

Although most of the primary Intelligence Objectives will be designated, the normal method of collecting technical Intelligence in the field by specialized Intelligence Officers (TAIU) or teams will continue.

7. INTERROGATION:

Specialized Air Force Interrogators will be attached or have access to all Interrogation Centers, Internment Camps (Military and Civil). In general, it is not intended that Air representation at detailed Interrogation Centers in JAPAN will consist of more than screening officers. (See Section VI)

8. SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE:

This forms the subject of separate inter-Service instruction.

SECTION IX

SEIZURE OF PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE TARGETS

1. a. The War Department and other Washington agencies have studied the JAPANESE internal situation in detail and selected "sources" where it is estimated particularly important intelligence may be found.

[REDACTED]

b. Such sources of needed intelligence are termed "intelligence targets", and it is evident that they will be particularly concentrated in urban areas. These targets may include any or several of the following:

- (1) Records and documents found in certain army hqs, buildings, ministries, factories, government agencies, etc.
  - (2) Persons of certain categories such as Imperial Headquarters officers; known scientists of a certain research laboratory, etc.
  - (3) Material and equipment, including munitions and materials of all kinds and those found in a certain factory, etc.
  - (4) Industrial plants.
  - (5) Agencies of diverse kinds such as the headquarters of a particular unit or type of unit, ministries, news bureaus, universities.
  - (6) Military or naval establishments or installations.
2. a. Early seizure, securing, and exploitation of such targets are essential according to priorities set by GHQ.
- b. By furnishing Military Police or, in an emergency, even a combat unit, in reserve, unit commanders will often be able to facilitate seizure and provide the temporary guard for a valuable target.
3. The detailed organization for the exploitation of intelligence targets will be the subject of later orders.
4. Certain targets are of primary interest for exploitation by air and naval commands, which will take the appropriate action indicated by the nature of the target. (See Section VIII and VII).

## SECTION X

### COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

1. GENERAL: The surrender of Japan or a substantial part thereof will alter the general mission of Counter Intelligence operations. In addition to insuring military security by denying information to the enemy, Counter Intelligence personnel will be confronted with the problem of suppression of organizations, individuals and movements whose existence and continued activities are considered an impediment to the lasting peaceful reconstruction of Japan. The nation wide character of organizations and movements within this category, and the dislocation of population which may precede our occupation will necessitate coordination and control of Counter Intelligence activities by General Headquarters, USAFPAC.

2. Personality Cards containing names of persons constituting a menace to Allied security should be compiled from Counter Intelligence files, to be supplied to Armies. Counter Intelligence staffs in the field will seek out and arrest all persons in Annexes A, as qualified thereafter by CinC AFPAC, especially members of the KEMPEI TAI, TOKUMU KIKAN, KOKURYU KAI, NISSHO and other extremist societies; see also Section I, paragraph 4.

3. Internment camps, for apprehended persons, will be established in accordance with local requirements; the Intelligence control remains the responsibility of Intelligence staffs, to be allocated for this purpose by Commanders; armies will provide for interrogation facilities at Internment camps, as necessary; further particulars regarding interrogations are in Section VI.

4. Lists of Headquarters of KEMPEI TAI, TOKUMU KIKAN, the KOKURYU DAI and other extremist societies are being supplied to Armies, covering towns and districts on their axis of advance. Commanders will arrange for the seizure of such premises. All persons found therein will be detained pending the arrival of Counter Intelligence officers. All documents will be seized and preserved for expert examination. (See Section V; also Annex A of this Section).

#### ELIMINATION OF EXTREMIST SOCIETIES AND PREVENTION OF THEIR REBIRTH:

5. The KEMPEI TAI, TOKUMU KIKAN, the KOKURYU DAI, other extremist societies such as NISSHO, and all affiliates will be dissolved. See Annex A and B, this Section.

#### DISPOSAL OF THE JAPANESE GENERAL STAFF:

6. G-2 GHQ will collect lists of all officers of the General Staff, to be furnished Naval Commands, Armies and Air Staffs for co-ordinated action.

7. GHQ AFPAC will be responsible for the control and disposition of Japanese Imperial Headquarters. Army Commanders are charged with control and disposition of subordinate headquarters and echelons of command within their respective areas of responsibility. Certain elements of these headquarters and echelons of command will be retained in being for the period necessary to disarm and demobilize the Armed Forces of JAPAN.

8. All General Staff Officers who have not been taken into custody as Prisoners of War, Officers who have adverse records, or are on Counter Intelligence Personality Cards, or listed as War Criminals, and any officer who is regarded as potentially dangerous, will be detained. In cases of officers functioning in Headquarters temporarily retained in being as outlined above, they will retain such liberties as are essential to performance of their assigned duties, subject to surveillance arranged by Counter Intelligence in consultation with military authorities concerned.

#### PREVENTION OF JAPANESE ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

9. Normal Counter Intelligence activities against enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive activities will be continued vigorously and intensive security education programs will be instituted to alert the troops to the vigilance necessary while present in enemy territory. The employment by Japanese of foreign nationals for espionage must be balanced by an adequate counter-espionage service coordinated with the theater G-2 on matters of theater level interest.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES OF GHQ, AFPAC:

10. This Headquarters will be responsible for the following:
  - (i) Direction of Counter Intelligence policy in Japan.
  - (ii) The supply of all necessary Counter Intelligence information. In order to discharge this function, Counter Intelligence will undertake the maintenance of a central Card Index of suspect personalities. It will also maintain a central record of all persons arrested and their locations.
  - (iii) Establishment of a policy regarding disposal of arrested suspects.
  - (iv) The setting up of a joint C.I. and O.I. organization for interrogation. For particulars, see Section VI.
  - (v) Technical research on sabotage and advice concerning preventive measures.
  - (vi) Coordination of Counter - Espionage on Theater level.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMIES:

11. Armies will be responsible for the following:
  - (i) Measures to implement the policy of GHQ.
  - (ii) Execution of Counter Intelligence measures in their respective areas.
  - (iii) Build-up and organization of Army and Corps (District) C.I. Staffs.
  - (iv) Organization of central registry and records system.
  - (v) Coordination of the interchange of information between subordinate units.
  - (vi) Report to GHQ.

#### NAVY AND AIR:

12. For particulars of Naval and Air Counter Intelligence, see Section VII and VIII respectively. These staffs will work in close cooperation with Army C.I. staffs.

LISTS OF ARRESTED PERSONS:

13. It will be necessary for a record of all persons arrested and their locations to be held centrally, so that immediate information is available to ascertain whether a suspect has already been arrested and where he is held.

ANNEX "A" SECTION X:

1. When the American Forces occupy Japan it will be necessary to arrest and detain a considerable number of persons in order to achieve the two main objects of safeguarding the security of the American Forces and accomplishing the destruction of Japanese organizations.

2. In addition to the Black List, the following categories of suspects will also be arrested and detained: (See Notes Below)

- a\*. Imperial Household
- b. Supreme Military Council: All personnel
- c\*. Privy Council
- d\*. Cabinet Ministers
- e\*. Vice Ministers
- f\*. Regional Superintendents - General of the 8 Administrative Districts
- g\*\*. General Staff (Army and Navy)
- h\*\*. Staffs of Military Districts in occupied countries and territories (Army and Navy)
- i. Staffs of Staff College (Army and Navy)
- j. Staffs of Military and Naval Academy
- k. Staffs of Training Establishments (Army and Navy)
- l. Kempei Tai
- m. Tokumu Kikan (Army and Navy)
- n. Koku Sui-To (Extreme Nationalist Party)
- o. CHIZAKURA (Connected with Manchuria)
- p. Kokurya Kai (Black Dragon Society)
- q. NISSHO and other extremist or terrorist societies.
- r. Administrative Officials of TEIKOKU ZAIGO GUNJIN KAI (Imp. Reserve Assn.)
- s. Administrative Officials of SOTEI DAN (Union of Able Bodied Men)
- t. Administrative Officials of SHONEN DAN (Youth Assn.)
- u. Administrative Officials of SEINEN DAN (Young Mens Assn.)

\* Subject to such limitations and detailed instructions as are specified in directives on Military Government, to be issued.

\*\* Subject to such limitations and detailed instructions as are specified in directives covering disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, to be issued.

ANNEX "B" SECTION X:

Offices and organizations which will be disbanded and cease to function at once, and in the case of which no problem of the disarmament and disbandment of para-military formations arises. Dissolution must cover all branch offices.

1. Political Association of Greater Japan (DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI).

This Association extends through Regional Prefectural and City or County levels down to District Group or City Ward Branches and Neighborhood Associations. For the purposes of military government by means of Hoko it may be desirable to preserve the lower levels of the above organizations such as the District Group or City Ward Branches and Neighborhood Associations.

- a. Political Affairs committee.
- b. Headquarters, sub-divided into the following sections.

- (1) Propaganda and enlightenment.
  - (2) National defense.
  - (3) Civilian life.
  - (4) Increased production.
  - (5) Youth movement.
  - (6) Party organization section.
  - (7) House of Representatives Section.
2. Nation-Wide Associations.
- a. Combat Corps.
  - b. People's Volunteer Corps.
  - c. Student Corps (GAKU DO TAI) succeeds Young Mens Association (SEINEN DAN).
  - d. Industrial Patriotic Service Association.
  - e. Agricultural Patriotic Service Association.
  - f. Patriotic Service Corps.
  - g. Mechanized National Defense Association.
  - h. Maritime Transportation Total Superintendence Section (with control offices at Kobe, Niigata, Fushiki, Tsuruga, Funakawa).
  - i. Shipping Management Association.
3. Organizations of Scientists.
- a. Technical Board.
  - b. Japanese Technical Society.
  - c. Science Mobilization Association.
  - d. All Japan Science League.

## SECTION XI

### CIVIL CENSORSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Effective censorship of civilian communications is dependent upon the centralization of the technical direction and control of censorship activities at the theater level. This control will be exercised with the primary objective of promoting military security and the peaceful future of the country and of detecting for action by appropriate agencies all activities running counter to these objectives. Since the national system of communication channels conforms to the pattern set by the physical facilities available to transmit, effective, economical censorship can be exercised only at the central points created by these physical facilities. These points may or may not coincide with those established for the purpose of effecting military government control.

2. The complication of the language problem in Japan and the paucity of linguists, require, at least initially, the compulsory use of English in communications.

3. Civil Censorship will be so conducted as to facilitate continuity of the large scale peaceful commerce required to maintain the flow of food supplies and materials for shelter to urban and other food deficient in war-ravaged areas.

4. Detailed Plan is in process of preparation to be issued later.

#### NAVAL CENSORSHIP:

5. Naval liaison Officers will be attached to GHQ AFPAC as arranged with CINCPAC, to coordinate Naval censorship with the general regulations laid down, and to provide Naval guidance where required for any civil censorship controlled by GHQ AFPAC.

[REDACTED]

SECTION XII

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

WIRE AND CABLE SECURITY:

1. Immediately subsequent to the surrender of Japan, existing enemy wire and cable circuits, both civilian and military, will to the extent necessary, be placed under strict United States Military control and restricted to the passage of United Nations military, naval and air traffic except as hereafter indicated. These systems may be used for the passing of communications and messages originated by enemy nationals and the nationals of other countries upon approval of the United States Military and Naval censors only. An active surveillance will be conducted on the circuits authorized for such use for the purpose of detecting and preventing illicit transmissions.

2. The United States Army Commanders and the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, within their respective zones of action, are charged with the responsibility for the measures necessary to insure compliance with the instructions contained in Paragraph 1 immediately above.

RADIO SECURITY:

1. To the extent necessary, military, naval, air and civilian owned radio transmitting and receiving stations (except radio receivers used for the reception of voice broadcasts) of the enemy and of the nationals of other nations will be seized, placed under strict military control and reserved for use of the United States Armed Forces and the armed forces of friendly nations except when their use is authorized for other purposes by the United States Army Commanders and the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, within their respective zones of action.

2. Active radio surveillance will be conducted in all areas for the purpose of the detection, interception and location of radio stations conducting illicit transmissions. The traffic so intercepted will be analyzed and the intelligence derived therefrom submitted to the appropriate headquarters for the necessary action.

3. United States Army Commanders and the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, within their respective zones of action, are charged with the responsibility for the measures necessary to insure compliance with the instructions contained in Paragraphs 1 and 2 immediately above.

## SECTION XIII

### ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The Japanese have made considerable progress in their industrial economy, science and technology since the beginning of the war. Their developments in these fields, particularly insofar as they have been adapted for war purposes, should be fully investigated and exploited.

2. The War Department will furnish a list of target objectives which are expected to be productive of intelligence of this nature. Responsibility for seizure of such objectives is defined in Section IV.

3. When exploitation of these objectives by experts dispatched by the War Department commences, the results acquired will fall into three broad categories:

(i) Documents: No document will be removed except under the procedure specified in Section V.

(ii) Materiel: This will normally be evacuated through established technical channels. It will not be taken out of Japan without the approval of the nearest appropriate technical intelligence staff and that staff will be responsible for forwarding this information through normal technical channels to GHQ AFPAC.

(iii) Reports of Experts: A copy of every report made will be sent to GHQ AFPAC together with all associated information obtained.

4. German Intelligence.

It is possible that intelligence may be available in Japan on German inventions, manpower, technical developments, economy, etc. Such information may prove valuable in the administration of occupied Germany and should be forwarded to the War Department through normal channels.

## SECTION XIV

### THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION IN TOKYO

1. TOKYO, the capital, is the intelligence nerve center for the entire Japanese Empire. While the city has undergone destructive fire and demolition raids, the preponderance of military and civil organizations in the urban area lend credence to the assumption that documents and other information of extreme importance to the US Government may still be recovered; "other information" refers to the interrogation of officials, who may be apprehended when the city is occupied.

2. An advanced echelon of G-2, AFPAC, and a Document Center (ATIS Advon) may be established in Tokyo to work with sections of Signal, Ordnance and Chemical Intelligence agencies.

3. Buildings housing the following organizations are believed to contain information which will be of immense assistance in the demobilization of the Japanese armed forces and the establishment of war crimes guilt:

Imperial Palace (Archives Section)  
Imperial General Staff  
War Department  
Navy Department  
Aviation Department  
Military Police Headquarters  
War College  
Metropolitan Police Bureau  
Foreign Office  
Diet Building  
Home Office  
Communications Office

[REDACTED]

Inspectorate General of Military Training  
Army Engineering School  
Military and Naval Arsenals  
German Embassy

4. The attention and Counter Intelligence personnel is invited to the possibility of depredations by fanatical members of organizations such as the Black Dragon Society, the Young Men's Association, Military Police, Junior Officers' League and the military Special Service Organization (Tokumu Kikan) which has functions similar to the former Gestapo.



[REDACTED]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

Annex 5 e

G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation  
With Respect to "Blacklist"

PART I

Military Situation:

See: "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, With Respect to operations Against Kyushu - Honshu (Abbreviated), 24 March 1945". "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to An Operation Against Southern Kyushu, 25 April 1945" as subsequently amended; "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation with respect to An Operation Against the Tokyo Plain of Honshu, 31 May 1945" as subsequently amended; Such Additional G-2 Estimates of the Enemy Situation With Respect to Specific Areas in Japan as may subsequently Be Issued; Current "Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions"; Current "Daily Intelligence Summaries"; A.G.S. Terrain Studies Nos. 131, 132, 134, 136-140, inclusive; A.G.S. Terrain Handbooks Nos. 84-92 inclusive. Note: The estimates listed above contain forecasts of military dispositions to Fall 1945 (Kyushu) and Spring 1946 (Honshu); they will be currently brought up-to-date by a series of operations amendments, which reach all addressees of G-3 Staff Studies, Plans and Operations Instructions.

PART II

Economic-Demographic-Geographical Situation.

1. Introduction:

The Commander of each occupied area will be faced not only with the problem of initial control of the Japanese Military Forces in his area, but essentially also of controlling and to some extent of maintaining the civil population. Therefore resources and installations, both military and civilian, are factors in planning and executing his occupation mission. Data with respect to the above factors are covered by the current Japanese Series of the A.G.S. Terrain Studies, Special Reports and Handbooks viz;

5e

	TERRAIN STUDIES No.	SPECIAL REPORTS No.	TERRAIN HANDBOOKS No.
Phase I			
Kanto Plain	132	-	99,100,101
Shimonoseki-Yawata	131,137	-	88
Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto	136	-	95, 94
Aomori-Ominato	140	-	-
Kcijo-Jinsen(Korea)	-	106	-
Phase II			
Nagasaki-Sasebo	131	-	85
Nagoya	134	-	97
Sapporo (Hokkaido)	-	104	-
Otomari	-	105	-
Fusan-Chinkai (Korea)	-	106	-
Phase III			
Hiroshima-Kure	137	-	92
Kochi (Shikoku)	138	-	90
Okayama	137	-	93
Tsuruga	-	102	-
Sendai	139	-	-
Niigata	-	103	-
Taiden-Gunzan-Zenshu (Korea)	-	106	-

2. The occupation areas, and objectives, as listed in para 3-a of the Basic Plan, are shown on attached maps, in Phases I to III incl., in relation to the textual coverage of the A.G.S. Studies.

a. Areas Covered: See Maps 1 and 2.

b. Applicable Sections: Information in the respective categories is presented in all terrain studies under the following Standard sections, tables of contents viz:

Military importance	Section II
Port and Harbors	Section IV
Anchorage	Section V
Description of Coast Line	Section VI
Physiography	Section VII
Vegetation	Section VIII
Rivers	Section IX
Lakes and Swamps	Section X
Airfield and Seaplane Bases	Section XI
Roads and Railroads	Section XII
Other Transport	Section XIII
Signal Communication	Section XIV
Cities and Towns	Section XV
Resources including Water Supply	Section XVI
Population	Section XVII
Administration	Section XVIII
Medical Problems	Section XIX
Climate & Meteorological Conditions	Section XX

"BLACKLIST"

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Basic Plan, Care and  
Evacuation of Allied Prisoners  
Of War and Civilian Internees

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1. Mission:

To locate United Nations prisoners of war and internees (definition: Appendix 1) in areas within scope of "BLACKLIST" operations and to provide for them adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care. To further provide for their registration and evacuation to rear areas. All Allied prisoners of war in Japanese custody, including merchant seamen, are repatriated at the earliest possible date consistent with military operations. The urgency of this mission is second only to military operations and to the maintenance of the forces of occupation.

2. Facts and Assumptions:

- a. Best estimates indicate there are approximately 36,000 personnel of various categories located in approximately 140 camps (details: Appendix 2).
- b. In most instances this personnel will be in extremely poor physical condition requiring increased diet, comforts and medical care.
- c. Poor housing and sanitary conditions will require immediate large scale transfers to best available facilities to be peremptorily commandeered.
- d. Complete reclothing will be imperative.
- e. Records in general will be incomplete for both survivors and deceased.

3. Responsibility:

- a. Commanding Generals of Armies, within their respective areas, are responsible for:

- (1) The location, care and safeguarding of all Allied recovered personnel.

- (2) Providing billets, food, clothing, comforts and medical care.

- (3) The initial processing (completion of RPD Form #44 and #23, Incl 1 to Circulars 19 and 20, this headquarters, dated 9 July 1945).

- [REDACTED]
- (4) The establishment of recoveree disposition centers near ports of embarkation as may be required.
  - (5) Evacuation of recovered personnel including all records, to recoveree disposition centers established by Commanding General, AFWESPAC, in the Philippines.
  - (6) The collection and preservation and forwarding of all records that may be captured pertaining to recovered personnel.
  - (7) Exact from the Japanese Civil Government and Military Command, in their respective areas, the maximum resources and facilities available to assist in the accomplishment of (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) above.
  - (8) The assumption of the operation of Allied prisoner of war and internment camps located within their respective areas.
- b. The Commanding General, AFWESPAC, is responsible for:
- (1) The receipt, billeting, rationing, clothing and medical care of recovered personnel in recoveree disposition centers established in the Philippines.
  - (2) The processing and evacuation from the Philippines of Prisoners of War and civilian internees after clearance by this Headquarters, and as arranged with the Governmental authorities concerned.
  - (3) Equipping of teams described in 4a(1) (2) and (3) below.
- c. This headquarters will:
- (1) Exact from the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command such assistance in handling of Allied prisoners of war and internees as may be appropriate, reference 3b(2) (h) 1 & 2 Annex 5b.
  - (2) Be responsible for the organization and training of necessary liaison, recovery and final processing teams.
  - (3) Arrange for required Allied representatives to accompany each team.

[REDACTED]

4. Requirements:

a. Personnel:

(1) Liaison teams:

One group of 3 officers and 3 enlisted men (1 each U.S., British and Dutch) attached to each Army (3) and each Corps (7).

(2) Recovery Teams:

One recovery team for each 500 POWs (approximately 70 teams), each composed of two officers (1 U.S. and 1 British) and four enlisted men (3 U.S. and 1 British). Twelve recovery teams of 1 enlisted man each (Dutch), to be attached as needed.

(3) Final Processing Center:

One Replacement Depot augmented by one British and one Australian processing unit comparable to a Replacement Battalion.

b. Supplies and Equipment:

(1) For prisoners of war and internees:

- (a) Ample clothing and equipment to meet the needs of comfort for each individual including women and children.
- (b) Subsistence of proper type and quantity.
- (c) Medical supplies and facilities to insure adequate medical care.

(2) For teams indicated in 4a(1) and (2):

To be furnished in accordance with table of allowances to be published later.

c. First available air, motor or water transportation is used to expedite movement of recoverees from their camps through disposition centers to their final destinations. Movement by air is utilized to the maximum extent.

[REDACTED]

5. Source of Means:

a. The Adjutant General and the Commanding General Special Troops of this headquarters to provide and train liaison and recovery teams; Commanding General AFWESPAC will establish and operate a final processing center.

b. Army commanders and Commanding General, AFWESPAC, in accordance with 3a and 3b above, to provide security and messing detachments (4a (4)) and supplies and equipment indicated in paragraph 4b above.

c. The Commanding General of each Army and the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, are responsible to furnish air, motor or water transportation as may be needed in the movement of recoverees for whom they have responsibility under 3a and 3b above.

6. Concept of Operation:

a. Axis of evacuation:

(1) Camps where found - recoveree disposition centers - final processing center - destination: for American, Canadian, British and Australian only. Nationals of other United Nations are held in final disposition centers until provision has been made for their disposition by their respective governments.

(2) Method: Highest priority air, motor or water transportation is provided in the movement of recoverees by commanders responsible under 3a and 3b above. Movement by air is used in the maximum extent. With the exception of priority given to the evacuation and repatriation of the sick and wounded, no distinction to be made in evacuation or repatriation as regards, rank, service or nationality.

b. Letter of instruction setting forth policies and procedures for the handling and processing of this personnel are furnished later by this headquarters to all concerned.

Appendix 1 - Definition of POWs and Internees.

Appendix 2 - Detailed information on POW camps.

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"BLACKLIST"

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Basic Plan, Care And  
Evacuation Of Allied Prisoners  
Of War and Civilian Internees

DEFINITION: UNITED NATIONS PRISONERS OF WAR

1. The term, "United Nations prisoners of war", as used herein includes all personnel held in Japanese custody:
  - a. Who are or have been members of, or persons accompanying or serving with, the armed forces of any of the United Nations, or
  - b. Who as members of the armed forces of countries occupied by Japan have been captured by the Japanese while engaged in serving the cause of the United Nations and who under the rules and customs of war, should be treated as prisoners of war even though not recognized as such by Japan, or
  - c. Who are or have been members of or serving with the merchant marine of any of the United Nations.
2. Such term does not include personnel who, although formerly held in Japanese custody as prisoners of war, have accepted release from the status in exchange for employment in or by Japan. Persons in this category, after appropriate identification will be dealt with as displaced persons.

DEFINITION: CIVILIAN INTERNEE

A civilian internee is a person without a military status, detained by the enemy, who is not a national of the Japanese Empire as constituted on 10 July 1937.

[REDACTED]

Basic Plan, Care And  
Evacuation of Allied Prisoners  
Of War And Civilian Internees

PRISONER OF WAR ENCAMPMENTS

JAPAN - HOKKAIDO

Name: ABASHIRI  
Coordinates: 44°01'N., 144°16'E

Name: ASAHIGAWA  
Coordinates: 43°46'N., 142°22'E. (AFS L764)

Name: HAKODATE MAIN CAMP  
Coordinates: 41°46'N., 140°42'E.  
Number: 400-336  
Nationality: U. S., British, Canadian, Dutch, Estonian,  
Australian

Name: HAKODATE  
Coordinates: 41°46'N., 140°42'E.  
Number: 200  
Nationality: U. S.

Name: HAKODATE DIVISIONAL CAMP  
Coordinates: Northwest of city in a wooded valley - faces  
south in pine-covered hills.  
Number: 400-500  
Nationality: American and British Imperial

Name: KAMISO Detachment Camp No. 1 - HAKODATE Extension  
Camp No. 1  
Coordinates: 41°50'N., 140°40'E.  
Number: 170  
Nationality: British, U. S.

Name: KUSHIRO  
Coordinates: 42°58'N., 144°23'E. (AFS L764)



Name: MOURORAN, Secondary Camp No. 1 - HAKODATE Sub  
Camp No. 1

Coordinates: 42°19'N., 141°00'E.

Number: 423

Nationality: U. S. British, Dutch

Name: OTARU

Coordinates: 43°12'N., 141°00'E.

Reported possibly closed

Name: RAIBA

Coordinates: 42°38'N., 140°26'E. (AMS L764)

Believed closed.

Name: SAPPORO

Coordinates: 43°03'N., 141°20'E. (AMS L764)

Nationality: One RAF

Name: TOMAKOMAI


Coordinates: 42°37'N., 141°31'E. (AMS L764)

Number: 200

Nationality: 40 women reported moved here from ZENTSUJI

NORTHERN HONSHU

Name: AKITA  
Coordinates: 37°46'N., 140°29'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 141  
Name: FUKUSHIMA No. 222  
Coordinates: 37°46'N., 140°29'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 141  
Nationality: Civilian internment  
Name: FURUMAKI STATION  
Coordinates: 40°40'N., 141°21'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 900-1000  
Name: IWAKE Coal Mine, or YUWAKI  
Coordinates: Approx. 37°02'N., 140°50'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 1000  
Name: KAMAISHI  
Coordinates: 39°16'N., 141°53'E. (AMS L773)  
Name: KANAZAWA  
Coordinates: 36°33'50"N., 136°39'30"E. (AMS L774)  
Name: KATSUYAMA  
Coordinates: 36°04'N., 136°30'E.  
Name: KOMATSU NAVAL AIRFIELD  
Coordinates: 36°22'N., 136°23'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 200  
Name: MATSUMOTO  
Coordinates: 36°13'N., 137°58'E.  
Name: MURAKAMI  
Coordinates: 38°11'N., 139°29'E. (AMS L773)  
Name: NAOETSU, NIIGATA KEN  
Coordinates: 37°10'N., 138°15'E. (AMS L773)  
Number: 50-300  
Nationality: Australian  
Name: NIIGATA Sub Camp No. 5

  
Coordinates: 37°55'N., 139°03'E. (AMS L773)

Number: 350-900

Name: OHASHI

Coordinates: 39°16'N., 141°44'E. (AMS L773)

Number: 600

Name: SENDAI

Coordinates: 38°15'N., 140°53'E.

Number: 27 Civilian internment

Nationality: U. S., Canadians.

[REDACTED]  
JAPAN - TOKYO BAY AREA

Name: AKASAKA WARD  
Coordinates: 35° 40'N., 139° 44'E. (AMS L774)  
Name: DENEM CHOFU MONASTERY  
Coordinates: 35° 35'N., 139° 42'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 12  
Nationality: Civilian Internment camp. Reported closed.  
Name: FUKAGAWA WARD  
Coordinates: 35° 40'N., 139° 50'E. (AMS L774)  
Name: KAWASAKI SUB CAMP No. 2.  
Coordinates: 35° 38'N., 139° 40'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 308, Another source, 241.  
Nationality: British, Dutch, American  
Name: NARASHINO  
Coordinates: 35° 42'N., 139° 59'E. (AMS L774)  
Nationality: Formerly reported at an airfield which is now a drill ground. Camp unlocated in this area.  
Name: OMORI NO. 8 TOKYO Camp, ORORI-KU IRRIARAI KILA)  
Coordinates: 35° 35'N., 139° 44' 30"E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 611  
Nationality: British, American, Australian, Others.  
Name: SHIBA PARK  
Coordinates: 35° 39'N., 139° 45'E. (AMS L774)  
Name: SHIBAURA DOCKS  
Coordinates: 35° 38'30"N., 139° 45'30"E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 100-600  
Name: SHINAGAWA No. 1  
Coordinates: 35° 36'30"N., 139° 45'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 60-250  
Nationality: 68 U. S. Civilians  
Name: SHINJUKU CAMP  
Coordinates: 35° 41'N., 139° 43'E. (AMS L774)

[REDACTED]

Number: 200  
Nationality: U. S.  
Name: SUMIREJO (SUMIRE GAKUAN)  
Coordinates: Information insufficient for pin-pointing  
Nationality: One source stated camp closed. Civ. & POWs.  
Name: TAKATANOBABA  
Coordinates: 35° 42'N., 139° 42'E (AMS L 774)  
Number: 3300  
Nationality: 1108 U. S.  
Name: TOKYO SECTIONAL CAMP.  
(See HIRAOKA Camp No. 3 in area 3 Miscellaneous.)  
Name: UENO PARK  
Coordinates: 35° 42' 40"N., 139° 46'40"E. (AMS L 774)  
Name: ACHI YAMAKITA  
Coordinates: 35° 26'N., 139°39'E (AMS L 774)  
Nationality: Civilian Internment  
Name: KANAGAWA CAMP  
Coordinates: 35° 25'50"N., 139° 40'18"E. (AMS L 774)  
Number: 540-1500  
Nationality: U. S., U. K., Dutch.  
Name: KAWASAKI CAMP  
Coordinates: Reported on outskirts of town, 2 to 3 kilometers from NISSAN Auto factory.  
Number: Several thousand reported.  
Name: KAWASAKI BUNSHO No. 1  
Coordinates: 35° 31'N., 139° 42'E. (AMS L 774)  
Number: 400  
Nationality: 21 U. S.  
Name: KAWASAKI DETACHMENT CAMP No. 5  
Coordinates: 35° 30'N., 139° 28'E. (AMS L 774)  
Number: 400  
Nationality: 22 Civilians from WAKE... 256 U. S. One source reports 265 Americans.

[REDACTED]

Name: NEGISHI RACE COURSE  
Coordinates: 35° 25'N., 139° 38'30"E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 11  
Nationality: Mostly civilians, but there may be a few POWs.

Name: NOGEYAMA PARK  
Coordinates: 35° 26'30"N., 139° 37'30"E.  
Number: 2000  
Name: OLD CITY HALL, YOKOHAMA  
Coordinates: 35° 26'30"N., 139° 37'30"E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 100  
Name: TAKAZAI  
Coordinates: KANAGAWA SECTION - unlocated, no coordinates.

Name: TOKYO CAMP NO. 3  
Coordinates: 35° 27'N., 139° 28'E. (AMS L774)  
Name: TOKYO CAMP CO. 5  
Coordinates: 35° 28'N., 139° 38'E. (AMS L774)  
Name: TSURUMA  
Coordinates: (See KAWASAKI BUNSHO Detachment Camp No. 5 or KAWASAKI Branch No. 1)  
Name: TOTSUKA  
Coordinates: 35° 24'N., 139° 32'E. (AMS L774)  
Nationality: Civilian internment.

Name: YOKOHAMA No. 5  
Coordinates: 35° 26'N., 139° 28'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 1000  
Nationality: 96 U. S.  
Name: YOKOHAMA YACHT CLUB BOATHOUSE  
Coordinates: 35° 26'N., 139° 40'E., (AMS L774)  
Number: 16 women, 4 Australian army nurses.  
Nationality: Civilian internment

There is a reported POW camp adjacent to Target 52, AOF 90.17 which consists of two-storied barracks buildings 50 x 100 meters, housing 200-250 men. A Japanese PW reports that many factories

[REDACTED]

in this area have special POW stockades attached to them some containing as many as 2000 men. No definite locations except that near Target 52 have been reported.

Name: ATAMI

Coordinates: 35° 06'N., 139° 04'E., (AMS L774)

Nationality: Officers camp

Name: CHIBA

Coordinates: 35° 35'N., 140° 07'E. (AMS L774)

Number: 100

Name: FUJI

Coordinates: 35° 08'N., 138° 29'E. (AMS L774)

Name: FURASHI

Coordinates: 35° 10'N., 138° 57'E.

Nationality: Unlocated

Name: HAKONE

Coordinates: 35° 17'N., 139° 02'E. (AMS L774)

Number: 200

Name: KIRAOKA CAMP NO. 3 (Tokyo Sectional Camp)

Coordinates: 35° 48'N., 140° 43'E.

Number: 224. One source states 757 U. S. POWs have been here.

Nationality: U. S. and British

Name: KITA COTYGARA MURA

Coordinates: 35° 06'N., 140° 12'E.

Nationality: Civilian internment.

Name: KOMINATO

Coordinates: 35° 07'N., 140° 13'E. (AMS L774)

Name: OFUNA

Coordinates: 35° 20'N., 139° 33'E.

Name: URAGA

Coordinates: 35° 14'N., 139° 43'E. (AMS L774)

Name: URAWA (SAITAMA)

[REDACTED]

Coordinates: 35° 51'N., 139° 39'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 56  
Nationality: Civilian internment, 3 U.S.  
Name: YAMASHITA (YAMAKITA) No. 1  
Coordinates: 35° 22'N., 139° 05'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 48  
Nationality: 7 U.S.  
Name: YOKOSUKA  
Coordinates: 35° 18'N., 139° 38'E. (AMS L774)  
Number: 200  
Name: ZENTSUJI CAMP No. 61  
Coordinates: 34° 14'N., 133° 46'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 800-4000, one source as of 1945, reports 468 total.  
Nationality: U. S.  
Name: ZENTSUJI SUB CAMP NO. 3  
Coordinates: Reclaimed ground near seashore. Wood and mud huts  
Number: 333  
Nationality: Dutch



[REDACTED]

JAPAN - CENTRAL HONSHU AND SHIKOKU

Name: AICHI  
Number: 15  
Nationality: Civilian Internment  
Name: GIFU - NAGARA HOTEL  
Coordinates: 35°27'N., 136°47'E.  
Name: NAGOYA CAMP  
Coordinates: 35°10'N., 136°55'E.  
Number: 3357 - several thousand reported December 1944.  
Nationality: 2000 U.S.  
Name: NAGOYA MILITARY INTERNMENT CAMP  
Coordinates: 35°11'N., 136°54'E.  
Name: HARUMI Sub Camp No. 11  
Coordinates: 35°05'N., 136°57'E.  
Number: 300-748  
Nationality: British, Canadian, Dutch and others.  
Name: HARUMI DAIDO ELECTRIC STEEL PLANT  
Coordinates: 35°05'N., 136°54'E. One source, 35°05'N., 136°57'E.  
Number: 700 - one source reports 100.  
Name: TSURUMI PARK  
Coordinates: 35°09'05"N., 136°55'20"E.  
Number: 3357 - one source 4000-5000  
Nationality: 2000 U. S.  
Name: UENO CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°46'N., 136°08'E.  
Name: AMAGASAKI SUB CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°43'N., 135°26'E. (AMS L889)  
Number: 192  
Nationality: U. K.  
Name: KOSHIEH HOTEL  
Coordinates: 34°43'N., 135°22'E.  
Name: MINATO KU (UNDOJO MAE)  
Coordinates: 34°39'N., 135°27'E (AMS 340738)  
Number: 2000  
Nationality: American, Australian, Indian.

[REDACTED]

Name: OSAKA CENTRAL MARKET CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°40'N., 135°29'E. (AMS 340887)  
Number: 350  
Nationality: U. S.

Name: OSAKA PRINCIPAL CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°38'N., 135°28'E. (AMS 340738)  
Number: 500-1100  
Nationality: U.S., British

Name: SAKAI PRISON  
Coordinates: 34°34'N., 135°29'E.  
Number: 4000

Name: SAKURAJIMA  
Coordinates: 34°40'N., 135°26'E.  
Number: 900  
Nationality: U.S., U.K. and 24 Civilians.

Name: SUMIYOSHI  
Coordinates: 34°36'30"N., 135°29'20"E.  
Number: 200-2000

Name: TENNOJI PARK  
Coordinates: 34°38'30"N., 135°30'E.

Name: UEDA BUNSHO  
(See OSAKA CENTRAL MARKET CAMP).

Name: YAHATAYA, MATSUMO CHO  
Coordinates: 34°39'N., 135°26'E. (AMS 340738)  
Number: 70  
Nationality: Australian

Name: AOTANI CAMP  
Coordinates: Reported near Canadian Academy

Name: FUTATABI CIVILIAN CAMP NO. 211  
Coordinates: 34°43'N., 135°11'E.  
Number: 174  
Nationality: 131 Americans believed from GUAM

[REDACTED]

Name: KAWASAKI SUB CAMP NO. 25  
Coordinates: 34°40'N., 135°11'E.  
Number: 423  
Nationality: Dutch, U. S., Australian, U. K.  
Name: KOBE  
Coordinates: 34°41'40"N., 135°11'01"E.  
Number: 100  
Name: KOBE DIVISIONAL CAMP (Sub camp No. 11)  
Coordinates: 34°41'N., 135°12'E. (AMS 340890)  
Number: 449, one source 311  
Nationality: British, Canadian, Portuguese, 20 Not accounted.  
Name: KOBE POW HOSPITAL  
Coordinates: Unlocated  
Number: 100  
Nationality: U.S., British, Dutch, Australians.  
Name: NARUYAMA PARK  
Coordinates: 34°41'N., 135°12'E (AMS 340890)  
Name: OKURAYAMA PARK  
Coordinates: 34°41'N., 135°11'E. (AMS 340890)  
Name: ORIENTAL HOTEL  
Coordinates: 34°41'N., 135°11'E. (AMS 340890)  
Probably interrogation center.  
Name: PRISON  
Coordinates: Near NANKO TEMPLE  
Number: 1200  
Name: SEKIGUCHI NO. 201  
Coordinates: 34°42'N., 135°13'E. (AMS 340890)  
Number: 55  
Nationality: Civilian internment camp  
Name: SUZARANDAI CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°45'N., 135°10'E (AMS L775)

[REDACTED]

Name: AIOSHI  
Coordinates: 34°50'N., 134°20'E.  
Number: 300  
Nationality: U.S.

Name: AWAJI SHIMA  
Coordinates: 34°16'N., 134°57'E.

Name: HARIMA or OO BAY CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°45'N., 134°28'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 400  
Nationality: Dutch

Name: HIMEJI CAMP - OSAKA DIVISIONAL CAMP NO. 26  
Coordinates: 34°47'N., 134°37'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 211-500  
Nationality: U. S.

Name: HIMEJI DIVISIONAL H.Q.  
Coordinates: 34°48'N., 134°44'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 500

Name: HIROHATA DIVISIONAL CAMP  
(See HIMEJI CAMP NO. 26)

Name: INNO SHIMA  
Coordinates: 34°18'N., 133°11'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 550 white - reported 100-1500 prisoners from Malaya

Name: KOBE CAMP  
Coordinates: 34°43'N., 134°48'E. (AMS L775) (Approximate coordinates of river mouth).  
Number: 300

Name: KOCHI  
Coordinates: 33°33'N., 133°33'E. (AMS L775)

Name: KURE  
Coordinates: 34°17'N., 132°33'E.  
Number: 2000

[REDACTED]

Name: KYOTO  
Coordinates: 35°00'N., 135°45'E. (AMS L775) (Coordinates of town).  
Number: 1000

Name: MAITSURI  
Coordinates: 35°30'N., 135°19'E.  
Number: 3000

Name: MIYOSHI  
Coordinates: 34°49'N., 132°49'E. (AMS L775)

Name: MUKAI SHIMA (Sub Camp No. 11)  
Coordinates: 34°24'N., 133°13'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: Reported several hundred.  
Nationality: British reported by one source, total of 80.

Name: NII HAMA  
Coordinates: 33°57'N., 133°16'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 1000

Name: OO BAY CAMP  
(See HARIMA)

Name: OSAKA DIVISIONAL CAMP NO. 26  
(See HIMEJI CAMP NO. 26)

Name: SHINGU  
Coordinates: 33°43'N., 135°59'E. (AMS L775)

Name: SUB CAMP NO. 12  
Coordinates: Unlocated in Fertile Hills in mining district.  
Number: 400  
Nationality: U.S. and Dutch

Name: SUB CAMP NO. 17  
Coordinates: Not known  
Number: 501  
Nationality: U. S.

Name: TOYOOKA  
Coordinates: 35°31'N., 134°50'E. (AMS L775)

[REDACTED]  
Name: WAKAYAMA

Coordinates: 34°12'N., 135°10'E. (Coordinates of Town)  
34°10'N., 135°15'E. (Coordinates of camp, reported).

Name: YODOGAWA CAMP

Coordinates: 34°53'N., 135°43'E. (AMS L775)

Number: 153, one source reports 300

Nationality: U. S.

Name: YONAGO

Coordinates: 35°26'N., 133°21'E. (AMS L775)

Name: YURA

Coordinates: 33°57'N., 135°07'E. (AMS L775)

JAPAN - WESTERN HONSHU, KYUSHU

Name: AINOURA, NAGASAKI Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°11'N., 129°40'E. (AMS L571)  
Number: 300

Name: BEPPU, OITA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°17'N., 131°30'E.  
Number: 200  
Nationality: Reported to be for convalescents

Name: FUKUOKA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°35'N., 130°23'E.  
Name: HIGASHI MISOME CAMP (Sub Camp #10)  
Coordinates: 33°56'N., 131°16'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 2100

Name: KOKURA, FUKOUKA Prefecture (KOSURA)  
Coordinates: 33°53'N., 130°53'E. (AMS L571)  
Name: KUMAMOTO  
Coordinates: 32°48'N., 130°53'E. (AMS L571)  
Number: 100

Name: KURUME, FUDUOUKA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°19'N., 130°57'E. (AMS L772)  
Name: MOJI  
Coordinates: 33°56'N., 130°57'E. (AMS L571)  
Number: 70  
Nationality: 233 U.S. civilians from WAKE

Name: MOTOHAMA or MOTOYAMA (Sub Camp No. 8)  
Coordinates: 33°57'N., 131°11'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 160  
Nationality: British

Name: NAGASAKI  
Coordinates: 32°45'N., 129°53'E. (AMS L571)  
Number: 2000

[REDACTED]

Name: OHAMA (Sub Camp No.9)  
Coordinates: 34°03'N., 131°40'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 150  
Nationality: British

Name: OMINE (Sub Camp No.6) MANAGUCHI Prefecture  
Coordinates: 34°03'N., 131°13'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 1082  
Nationality: Dutch, U.K.

Name: OMUTA, FUKUOKA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°01'N., 130°26'E. (AMS L722)  
Number: 100-300

Name: ONGA, FUKUOKA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 33°49'N., 130°47'E. (AMS L571)  
Number: 1000

Name: SADURAJIMA, KAGOSHIMA Prefecture  
Coordinates: 31°34'N., 130°36'E. (AMS L772)

Name: SASEBO  
Coordinates: 33°11'N., (AMS L571)  
Number: 500  
Nationality: Possibly Australian

Name: SHIMONOSEKI, YAMAGUCHI Prefecture, CHUGOKA  
Coordinates: 33°58'N., 130°58'E.  
Number: 500

Name: UBE (Sub Camp No.7)  
Coordinates: Reported 33°56'N., 131°16'E. (AMS L775)  
Number: 258  
Nationality: U.S., British

Name: YAWATA  
Coordinates: 33°52'N., 130°49'E (AMS L571)  
Number: 800-1000



KOREA

Name: FUSAN (PUSAN), NICHIKI MACHI  
Coordinates: 35° 06' N., 129° 02' E.  
Number: 120-500  
Nationality: Australian, American  
Name: JINSEN - NEW DIVISIONAL CAMP  
Coordinates: 37°28' N., 126°38' E.  
Number: 252  
Name: KEIJO # 81  
Coordinates: 37°32' N., 126°58' E.  
Number: 200  
Nationality: American, British & Australian  
Name: KEIJO No. 2  
Coordinates: 37°33' N., 126°58' E.  
Number: 200  
Nationality: Australian and British  
Name: KEIJO  
Coordinates: Camp reported across road from Parade ground on northeast corner of cross road on way from 78th Infantry Regiment Barracks to the Parade Ground.  
Number: 607  
Nationality: United Kingdom, Australian.  
Name: KEIJO City Prison  
Coordinates: 37°33' N., 126°57' E.  
Number: 2  
Name: KOREA Divisional Camp  
Number: 75  
Name: KONAN New DIVISIONAL Camp  
Coordinates: 39°52' N., 127°35' E.  
Number: 23  
Nationality: United Kingdom, Australian  
Name: KOREA #223  
Nationality: Civilian internment

[REDACTED]

Name: KOSHU

Coordinates: Camp reported in city of this name - may be in CHUSEINAN, KOKAIDO, or ZENRANAN Prefectures.

Name: RYUZAN  
(See KEIJO #2)

Name: SEISHIN


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Number: 230


Name: REPHO

Coordinates: 39°00'N., 125°40'E.







# JAPAN-HOKKAIDO




# JAPAN-NORTHERN HONSHU



# JAPAN-TOKYO BAY AREA



# JAPAN-CENTRAL HONSHU AND SHIKOKU





"BLACKLIST"

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS  
OF CINCPAC PLAN "CAMPUS"  
PERTAINING TO  
NAVAL AND AMPHIBIOUS PHASES  
"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS.

I. TASKS OF NAVAL FORCES.

Conduct the amphibious phases and support thereafter the land phases of the occupation of strategic areas in JAPAN and KOREA.

Insure the clearance of mine fields.

Maintain lines of communications to the occupied areas.

Ensure the destruction or seizure of all elements of the enemy fleet.

Insure the surrender to Allied control of all enemy shipping.

Establish such naval and naval air facilities as are required for the support of the naval elements of the Occupation Forces.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. Enemy Situation

Our operations in preparation for OLYMPIC will continue at an increasing rate to destroy the Japanese economic and industrial organization. Japanese shipping routes through the EAST CHINA SEA are closed. Restriction imposed upon sea communication between JAPAN and the mainland of ASIA by our surface, air, submarine, and mining operations will increase. In spite of impaired communications and heavy damage to the industrial system sustaining the major Japanese war effort there will remain, at the time of the capitulation, certain establishments which will probably be capable of supporting strong local assaults upon our Occupation Forces.

Surface forces of the Japanese Navy are no longer able to offer effective opposition, but some submarines remain capable of damaging surprise attacks.

Notwithstanding the weakness of Japanese air forces, we cannot disregard the possibility of air attacks, particularly suicide attacks, against us during the occupation.

[REDACTED]

Minefields impeding our free access to the SEA OF JAPAN and to Japanese harbors and coastal waters will remain in position at the time of the surrender. Coast and harbor defenses have until the present escaped destruction at our hands and may be capable of inflicting heavy losses upon our forces.

## 2. Own Situation

During the period prior to OLYMPIC and between OLYMPIC and CORONET, a large portion of our naval forces will be rehabilitating and preparing for succeeding operations. Most of the amphibious lift will be engaged in administrative troop and cargo movements, and many ships will be undergoing overhaul. It is anticipated, however, that forces and shipping can be assembled within a reasonable time to support the occupation of the areas of first strategic importance, and that the availability of shipping will progressively improve with the approach of the OLYMPIC target date.

Prior to and during OLYMPIC, fast carrier task forces will make attacks on the Japanese home islands and will be available at any time for operations incident to the occupation of JAPAN following unconditional surrender.

Units of the amphibious support forces will be engaged in exercising control of the seas, in minesweeping, and in providing security for elements so engaged. Allowing for these and other minor commitments, it will be possible to assemble sufficient amphibious support forces for the occupation without delay.

The critical feature involved in occupying Japanese territory prior to 1 September 1945 is the timely assembly of assault shipping at the mounting areas. It is estimated that by late August about three weeks will be required for the assembly of sufficient assault shipping in mounting areas to lift the number of divisions required for the minimum initial occupation. After 1 September 1945 no serious problem is presented as most units are scheduled to commence assembling in the mounting areas for OLYMPIC. By 22 September 1945 it is estimated that there will be sufficient assault shipping available in the mounting areas to lift thirteen reinforced combat divisions and by 1 October 1945 sufficient to lift fourteen divisions.

[REDACTED]

### 3. Operations

As long as the attitude of the Japanese is doubtful, dispositions, movements, and security precautions throughout the approach and occupation of each objective area will be as for an amphibious operation against an active enemy.

The planning and preparation for this operation during the period preceding 1 November 1945 will not be permitted to interfere with the preparations which must be made during that same period to insure the successful initiation and execution of the OLYMPIC operation. Neither will the planning and preparation during the period following OLYMPIC be permitted to interfere with the preparation necessary for the timely execution of the CORONET operation. It is therefore necessary that the planning and preparation for the occupation of strategic areas of JAPAN in the event of her sudden collapse or surrender be carefully integrated into the overall plans for the conquest of JAPAN.

The planning and execution will be coordinated with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific. Command responsibilities and command relationships will be as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The naval phases of the occupation will be conducted primarily by the THIRD and FIFTH Fleets. The forces in the PHILIPPINES will support the operation according to their resources and as the circumstances may indicate at the time. The THIRD Fleet will consist essentially of the fast carrier task groups; the FIFTH Fleet will include the amphibious, support, and mine forces. The coordination and overall control of all fleets and other naval forces will be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

After the surrender of JAPAN it is estimated that two to four weeks will be required to assemble assault shipping, mount troops, and move to the assigned areas.

[REDACTED]

Phases I, II and III - Occupation of JAPAN by U. S. Army Forces

During these phases of the operation, selected major strategic centers of JAPAN and KOREA will be occupied by U.S. Army Forces covered and supported as required by available naval forces.

The preparation and conduct of the operations will be decentralized to designated Army Commanders and corresponding Naval Task Force Commanders to the greatest extent consistent with essential coordination. Commanders, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies will be charged by CINCPAC with the coordination of planning of operations within their respective assigned areas of responsibility.

An Amphibious Force Commander will be designated to conduct the movement to the objective of the force assigned each army. Commander THIRD Amphibious Force will move the Eighth Army, Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force the Sixth Army and Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, the Tenth Army. The coordination and overall control of these amphibious forces will be exercised by Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet (COMPHIBSPAC).

In post-Phase I operations in JAPAN Proper and KOREA, Amphibious Force Commanders will arrange with the Army Commanders concerned for employment of short-range amphibious forces with appropriate support on a scale of one divisional lift per Army area as may be required for naval and amphibious phases of such operations.

III. NAVAL AIR FORCES

1. Forces Available

Four (4) or five (5) carrier task groups will be available for the support of the operation and can be deployed in a relatively short time. Similarly, four (4) divisions of CVE's will be available. Naval shore-based air forces probably available are listed below:

MARIANAS

	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>February 1946</u>
VPB(HL) Sqs	5	5	5	5	4	4

OKINAWA

	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>February 1946</u>
VPB(MS) Sqs		8	8	8		
VPB(HS) Sqs		1	1	1		

[REDACTED]

KYUSHU

	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>February 1946</u>
VMF Gps					3	3
VMF(N) Sqs					2/3	2/3
VMB Gps						1
VMSB-VMTB Gps						1
VPB(HL) Sqs						4

2. Operations

a. Carrier Forces

Fast Carriers

All fast carrier task groups will be assigned initially to the Third Fleet under the operational control of Commander THIRD Fleet. The fast carrier task force will provide general support for this operation.

Carrier-based aircraft will provide general support and cover, will conduct air strikes as may be required, will conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of objective areas and will maintain a show of force over these areas.

Escort Carriers

Escort carriers assigned to the occupation forces will provide air cover for the movement of these forces to the objective areas, and will provide direct air support if required.

Transport Carriers

Transport carriers will operate with the logistic support groups to provide replacement aircraft, parts, and pilots and aircrews. As required, they will transport garrison aircraft to the objective area.

b. Shore Based Air Forces

Fleet Air Wings

Fleet Air Wings will conduct extensive search and reconnaissance operations in the waters surrounding the Japanese home islands, including the INLAND SEA, and in waters adjacent to Japanese holdings on the Asiatic mainland.

[REDACTED]

If required, they will conduct overwater search and attack on minor enemy naval forces and shipping in conjunction with submarines and other naval forces.

COMMARIANAS will provide a streamlined advanced air base assembly for early movement to YOKOSUKA. COMAIRPAC will provide three advanced air base assemblies for employment in the vicinity of KURE, SASEBO, NAGASAKI and OMINATO. He will also augment the assembly at YOKOSUKA and replace personnel and equipment drawn from the MARIANAS.

Naval and Marine air units will be installed at the naval bases as follows:

YOKOSUKA	1 VMF Gp (including 1 VMF(N) Sq)
	2 VPB (MS) Sqs (tender based initially)
	NATS Terminal
SASEBO-NAGASAKI (Site to be selected)	1 VMF Gp (including 1 VMF(N) Sq)
	2 VPB(MS) Sqs (tender based)
	NATS Terminal
KURE	2 VMR Sq
	1 VPB(MS) Sq (tender based)
	NATS Terminal
OMINATO	1 VPB(MS) Sq
	NATS Terminal

Seaplane search squadrons may be replaced by land plane squadrons if developments necessitate.

#### IV. NAVAL FORCES

##### 1. Forces Available.

Fast carrier task groups, both American and British, are organized and will be prepared to provide general air support for these operations at any time.

Elements of the forces normally used in amphibious support will be engaged in upkeep, training and minor operations during August, September and October. No difficulty is anticipated in assembling a sufficient number of these forces for the operation.

[REDACTED]

Assault shipping during August will be actively engaged in administrative troop and cargo movements in the PACIFIC. This employment includes the SOUTH PACIFIC roll-up, amphibious training in the PHILIPPINES, roll-up of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC rear areas, and forward lift from the West Coast into the PACIFIC OCEAN areas. The preponderance of available assault transports and cargo vessels will be operating in forward lifts from the West Coast. If CAMPUS is executed during this period it is anticipated that provisional transport squadrons will be organized from the available shipping. It is estimated that approximately two weeks will be required to assemble sufficient assault shipping in the Western Pacific to mount seven combat divisions during the period 1 - 15 August, eight combat divisions during the period 15-31 August, and nine combat divisions during the period 1-15 September. In September assault shipping will be proceeding to the mounting areas for OLYMPIC. Two squadrons are scheduled to assemble in the HAWAIIAN area by 2 September while the last squadrons are scheduled to be available in the PHILIPPINES by 20 September. It is estimated that sufficient assault shipping will be available to mount eleven combat divisions during the latter part of September. Fourteen transport squadrons will be operating continuously in the WESTERN PACIFIC from October through March and will be available on relatively short notice to mount Occupation Forces as required.

A schedule of assault shipping estimated to be available in the Eastern and Western Pacific areas follows:

	<u>1-15</u> <u>AUGUST</u>		<u>15-31</u> <u>AUGUST</u>		<u>1-15</u> <u>SEPTEMBER</u>		<u>15-30</u> <u>SEPTEMBER</u>		<u>OCTOBER</u>		<u>NOVEMBER</u>
	<u>EP</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>EP</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>EP</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>EP</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>EP</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>WP</u>
APA	116	75	74	90	52	131	30	165	30	180	212
AP	17	0	17	0	17	0	17	0	0	17	17
APH	0	2	0	2	0	3	0	3	0	3	3
AKA	44	37	26	43	17	57	13	65	12	79	95
LSD	7	6	7	6	3	10	3	10	0	13	13
LSV	1	5	1	5	0	6	0	6	0	6	6
LST	100	500	100	500	125	500	100	550	50	600	600
LSM	50	350	50	350	50	350	50	350	20	380	400
APD	18	49	18	49	24	49	0	73	0	89	89